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Since the early 1990s, film theorists have been particularly interested in the studies of 
film experience and relations between viewers and films. In contrast to the classical and post-
1960s film studies of spectatorship, recent film theory has made a substantial contribution to the 
development of phenomenological perspectives on the film viewing, engaging concepts, and 
methods rooted in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The 
phenomenological endeavor has served as an alternative epistemological paradigm competing 
with established theoretical approaches to questions about how to study the film experience and 
what constitutes the nature of film spectatorship. This paradigm marks a shift from thinking of 
the viewer as an ideal, abstract subject to thinking of him/her as an embodied, material agent 
whose existence represents the integral whole with the film and the world as such. While 
acknowledging the diversity and hybridity of film phenomenology, this thesis focuses on the 
sociocultural, heuristic and philosophical foundations underlying the entire phenomenological 
project in contemporary film studies. It examines film phenomenology not as a complete 
“Grand” theory of film experience but as a specific methodology and model of philosophizing, 
which challenge ocularcentrism, rationalism, the body-mind and the subject-object dichotomies 
of the previous film theories and Western epistemologies in general. By investigating the 
intellectual heritage of philosophical phenomenology and such basic phenomenological notions 
as experience, intentionality, reduction, and description, this study aims to delineate and clarify 
the fundamental strategies employed by film phenomenology in the exploration of cinematic 
experience. The emphasis on these strategies and central assumptions of film phenomenology is 
motivated by the desire to uncover the cultural and research potential of the phenomenological 
project which often seems to be obscure and ambiguous, and for this reason irrelevant. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The advent of digital technologies, changes in viewing practices, and formation of 
alternative models of film distribution have encouraged film scholars to turn to the critical 
reexamination of the major ontological and aesthetic theories of cinema. Based on concerns 
about medium specificity, mostly elitist concepts of art, and predetermined models of 
spectatorship, these theories have seemed insufficient to explain ongoing cultural processes.   
In dialogue with them, such crucial questions of the current debates on film as “What 
distinguishes digital cinema from traditional cinema?” or “Does cinema still exist in the digital 
era?” have been formulated. 
In answering these questions, there is plenty of disagreement revealing the contradictions 
and anxieties of contemporary film theory. While acknowledging some similarities between 
photographic cinema and digital cinema, the scholars defending the medium-specificity thesis 
tend to consider digital cinema as a radically new medium (Gaut, 2010; Mitchell, 1992; Mulvey, 
2006). For them, the indexical connection between original and its image is what characterizes 
traditional mechanically generated cinema. At the same time, a digital image generated by a 
bitmap or “mathematical representation” (Gaut 14) represents the fundamental dissociation from 
physical reality. Thus, Laura Mulvey, for whom “the end of cinema” is apparent, writes, “the 
digital, as an abstract information system, made a break with analogue imagery, finally sweeping 
away the relation with reality, which had, by and large, dominated the photographic tradition” 
(Death 24x a Second 18). Berys Gaut also refers to the crisis of the indexical and identifies the 
unique properties of digital cinema, among them the possibility of easy, direct manipulation 
without degradation, limited amount of information within the digital image, absence of film 
grain, colour differences and other specific aesthetic features produced by the material basis of 
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photochemical film, and most importantly, interactivity (17-18). Arguing that “we have entered 
the age of electrobricollage,” William J. Mitchell points out that mutability and manipulation are 
crucial for digital cinema (6). For him, even though the reworking of photographic images is 
possible, it is always difficult and recognizable. Digital cinema, in turn, due to its ontological 
slipperiness, absolutizes the transformation and appropriates it as an inherent quality. 
These attempts to define what makes digital cinema a new medium different from the 
film medium, however, do not seem to be unproblematic for the scholars who regard the advent 
of digital cinema as a challenge to the established assumptions about the nature of film, film 
production and consumption. The digital technologies, especially when they converge with 
traditional film, shed light on the complexity of the identity and history of cinema. Watching an 
“old” movie on DVD or online, we deal with the previously overshadowed paradoxes of 
indexicality and technological basis of cinema.  
First, it becomes evident that, as Tom Gunning suggests, the indexical and the digital do 
not exclude each other, whereas the indexical and the photographic are not equivalent (24). To 
support this claim, he refers to the example of digital passport photograph to show that numerical 
data can be linked to reality. Another example is various instruments of measurement (medical 
devices, barometer, etc.) which demonstrate that indexicality can be expressed not through the 
photographic but numbers. Gunning concludes that “the apparatus, in itself, can neither lie not 
tell the truth” (28). To identify an image as “true” or transformed, we rely on our knowledge and 
experience. In this regard, Gerald Mast notes that “Our sense of conviction is perhaps the most 
individual and personal response we make to a mimetic work and it differs considerably even 
among those of equal experience, knowledge, and refinement” (52).  
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Second, the rise of digital cinema has drawn attention to the issues of technological 
stability and transparency of the film medium, on the one hand, and its photographic nature, on 
the other. The introduction and ceaseless development of sound, color technologies, screen and 
other innovations characterize cinema as a medium which always exists in a state of transition 
and resists an essentialist approach. Due to its technological uncertainty, cinema has features that 
are supposed to be characteristic of other media forms. In the context of debates on 
digitalization, it is noted that the capacity to directly transform and remediate attributed to digital 
cinema can be found in analogue cinema which manipulates through exposure rate, lenses, etc. 
Also, as Anne Friedberg points out, interactivity and modes of digital spectatorship can be traced 
back to such pre-digital analogue technologies as the video cassette recorder, the remote control, 
and the cable television (440). In the digital epoch, the very idea that cinema descends from 
photography is put into question. The photographic film is considered as one of the possibilities 
of cinema also rooted in animation. Likewise, digital cinema can be treated as a kind of cinema, 
a realization of its hidden potential but not as a radical divergence from film. In this regard, Lev 
Manovich underscores that digital cinema is a restoration of the cinematic practice marginalized 
by institutions in the twentieth century and new media as such represent a return of “the 
repressed of the cinema” (192). Domietta Torlasco refers to digital cinema as an archival 
medium that reconceptualizes the history of traditional cinema and clears the path for “the 
discovery (never to be exhaustive) of its [film’s] multiple, conflicting, hardly lived pasts” (ix). 
Undoubtedly, new technologies offer us something that was suppressed or unrealized by 
other cinematic forms and institutions. However, antiessentialist scholars suggest, the emphasis 
on technology and comparative analysis of photographic and digital apparatuses may lead to the 
construction of universalized totalities and imposing of misconceptions on the history of cinema 
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and audiences. The role of both traditional film and digital cinema cannot be reduced to their 
technological basis but needs to be explored through the prism of analysis of how we interact 
with them. In this light, the former and contemporary cinemas represent the viewing practices 
shaped and guided not only by technology but also by bodily involvement, knowledges, cultural 
and social conventions. Francesco Casetti underscores that today it is of particular importance to 
understand that “what identifies a medium is first and foremost a mode of seeing, feeling, 
reflecting, and reacting, no longer necessarily tied to a single ‘machine’” (5). Thus, the focus of 
film studies and film theory must be significantly expanded on the viewer’s experience and 
relation to film.  
This shift from thinking of cinema as a medium that possesses certain generic properties 
to thinking of it as a specific kind of experience marks an important transition from ontology to 
phenomenology of cinema. Even though the issue of analogue/digital spectatorship is beyond the 
scope of this work, I should underscore that the increase of attention to the experience of media 
and decline of ontological projects was stimulated by the sensuous reorganization generated by 
the digital revolution. While characterizing the digital experience, Casetti identify such its crucial 
features as relocation of the viewer to the previously unknown territories due to new devices and 
platforms (the Internet, television, smartphone, etc.), the desire to recuperate the connection with 
film through its relics or fragments (DVDs, TV programs, video games, etc.) resulting in a return 
of cinephilia, reconstruction of an imagined audience and other “lost” or weak components of 
traditional film experience, engagement with diverse discourses due to expansion and 
transmedial logic of cinema, regime of display rather than of screen, and switch from “attending” 
traditional spectatorship to performance, which means that the viewer becomes an active, visible 
participant of the process of film exhibition, production and distribution. Casetti concludes that 
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contemporary media environment allows film to conserve its “authenticity,” but what has 
changed is an experiential environment and “system of sensations” accompanying cinema.   
Gunning agrees with this argument and expresses one of the key premises of 
contemporary film theory by stating that “It is only by a phenomenological investigation of our 
investment in the photographic image (digital or otherwise obtained) that I think we can truly 
grasp the drive behind digitalization . . .” (32). The rise of phenomenological project, thus, has 
been motivated by the technological transformations which have challenged our knowledge 
about cinema, its past, and our interaction with it in particular. The phenomenological studies of 
film have been considered as a contribution to a more sophisticated philosophical understanding 
of cinema through the concept of experience and as a proper paradigm to reconsider 
conventional film ontologies in the epoch of digital technologies.  
Meanwhile, the attention toward the category of experience as such was symptomatic for 
the fundamental epistemological revolution in humanities in the 1980s. This revolution marked 
the definitive collapse of the Western “politics of reason” and the transition from the dominance 
of a rational mode of exploration of the world to an acceptance of the non-linguistic, experiential 
and personal connection with it. In this regard, the fact that since the 1990s phenomenology has 
been one of the leading frameworks for understanding film and spectatorship does not seem to be 
conditioned exclusively by the technological changes. Film phenomenology grew out of the 
impulse to explain the lived experience of our interaction with the world by focusing on the 
complexity and diversity of the modes of this interaction. 
While talking about the phenomenological paradigm in film theory, I should note that this 
concept can be used in two senses. In a broad sense, it refers to receptionist media studies in 
general and can be applied to a vast range of approaches focusing on the issues of spectatorship. 
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For instance, the sociological and historical approach of audience research or the cognitive film 
theory based on neuroscience and perceptive psychology and focusing on the viewer’s mental 
and physiological processes are all in fact a part of film phenomenology.  
In a narrow and more accurate sense, however, film phenomenology encompasses the 
philosophical study of cinematic experience, engaging theories rooted in Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology of the lived-body and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. 
Here, by phenomenology I mean a specific theoretical and methodological program which 
focuses on “what we directly experience” and on “the objects of our experience before we start 
thinking about them, interpreting them or attributing any meaning to them” (Crotty 79). The 
phenomenological requirement to study the film experience in its immediacy and directedness 
implies focus on the existential situatedness of the viewer within the material, embodied world 
where film is not a set of pre-given meanings and physiological stimuli but an essential 
component of physical reality. By following a phenomenological philosophy, film 
phenomenologists, such as Vivian Sobchack, Laura U. Marks, Jennifer Barker, Jane Stadler and 
others have restated the very notion of cinematic experience. Criticizing classical film theory and 
the post-1960s theories inspired by psychoanalytic, semiotic, and cognitive approaches for 
ocularcentrism, determinism, and ahistoricism, the scholars consider film viewing as “a dialogic 
exchange between viewing subjects [spectator and film itself] who share the finite and situated 
conditions of objective embodiment and also share their uniquely and finite existence in a 
common, if contested, cultural world” (Sobchack 307). 
The assertion of spectatorship as embodied and, at the same time, culturally situated 
experience has overcome the orthodox Western division between body and mind, on the one 
hand, and body and culture, on the other. It has provided a platform for constructing theories of 
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embodied vision with focus on the haptic, kinesthetic, visceral involvement of spectator.  
Moreover, the influential characterization of the film experience as a “dialogic exchange,” 
contact between human and cinematic bodies has brought into being theories of embodied 
visuality, that is based on the ability of film to signify “through its materiality” (Marks xi) and 
through materiality of the spectator’s body as well.  
The elaboration of these theories in the 1990s and their complete legitimization in the 
2000s is what I call “phenomenological turn” in film theory within the scope of this work.  
If we want to understand the institutional processes and epistemological trends which 
characterize the development of contemporary film studies, it is important to pay attention to this 
influential paradigm shift toward the embodied film viewing as the existential experience of 
material integrity with the world and film.  
As of today, there are no separate studies which would thoroughly analyze the factors and 
the academic and cultural contribution of the phenomenological turn in film theory. Its origins 
and place within film studies remains generally unexplored. In addition, the philosophical  
foundations of phenomenological film theory are still obscure. On the one hand, it deals with the 
fact that phenomenology itself represents a complex, multidimensional philosophical tradition. 
Such different philosophical systems as transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, 
theory of Dasein of Martin Heidegger, existential phenomenology by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Hanna Arendt, etc., and poststructuralist critique constitute 
the diversity of the phenomenological current and demonstrate the variety of phenomenological 
approaches to the understanding of subjectivity, objectivity, body, matter, and culture. The fact 
that philosophy is often ignored in film studies prevents film scholars and students from 
understanding how these phenomenologies can inform film theory and be applied in practice. On 
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the other hand, phenomenological film theory is not a single movement either. As Jenny 
Chamarette suggests, it would be more pertinent to talk about film phenomenologies which are 
“hybrid, flexible, lucid, pliable approaches” (“Embodied Worlds” 293). The diversity of film 
phenomenology makes its conceptual apparatus and methodological models obscure, which 
leads, in turn, to the marginalization of film phenomenology, misrepresentation of its intentions, 
and nonreflexive scholarship. Despite the hybridity, there are fundamental assumptions which 
can be attributed to the entire project of film phenomenology and used as guiding intuitions in 
the phenomenological study of film. 
Thus, we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation. Today phenomenology is one of the 
leading perspectives in the studies of film spectatorship and a promising alternative to the 
disembodied approaches formed within the Western, Cartesian line of thinking. Nevertheless, the 
philosophical basics and strategies of film phenomenology as a research project seem to be 
unclear and used randomly. Likewise, we are not familiar with the cultural and institutional 
mechanisms underlying the phenomenological turn and authority of film phenomenology today. 
This thesis centers on these two problems and aims to examine both cultural and 
theoretical framework of the phenomenological turn in film studies. Thus, the goal of this work 
is to provide a deeper account of how the general cultural conditions and philosophical schemas 
inform film phenomenology and determine its place within the contemporary film theory.  
The above goal will be accomplished by fulfilling the following research objectives. 
First, I will examine the fundamental epistemological and sociocultural origins of the 
phenomenological turn in film studies. I will consider how this paradigm relates to previous film 
theory and general philosophical thought. While acknowledging that models of academic 
cognition and cultural context are interconnected, I will attempt to explain how the rise of film 
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phenomenology has been shaped and determined by some specific historical processes. My task 
here is not to offer a comprehensive historical analysis but to delineate the fundamental trends 
underlying the turn to the body and experience in film and media scholarship.   
Second, I will try to analyze the major philosophical traditions of phenomenology and 
such basic concepts as experience, intentionality, phenomenological reduction, and 
phenomenological description. I will clarify how philosophical phenomenology has influenced 
on both classical and contemporary film theory.  
Finally, I will focus on how philosophical phenomenology reveals itself within film 
theory itself. By analyzing film phenomenology as a dialectic of the embodied seeing and the 
seen, I hope to summarize the most fundamental philosophical foundations of this research 
paradigm. 
My endeavor to examine film phenomenology as an institutional phenomenon 
corresponding with the contemporary cultural tendencies and as a specific program based on 
common philosophical and heuristic assumptions has epistemological, pedagogical, and ethical 
value.  
First, by analyzing the cultural agenda and theoretical approaches of film 
phenomenology, we can better understand and therefore overcome the limitations of a 
hierarchical concept of senses and ocularcentric paradigm prevailed in classical and post-
classical film theory and Western philosophical thought in general. In addition, this research may 
help us develop greater insights into spectatorship in the digital age and elaborate 
phenomenological perspective on such bodily technologies as interactive movie screens, 4D 
cinema, film networking, digital sound systems, etc. While knowing how phenomenological 
model of research works and reflects the reinventing of the spectator’s body, we also can trace 
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the transformation of spectatorship through time and clarify how contemporary film viewing 
existentially and culturally relates to experience of cinema in the past. 
Second, the analysis of the fundamental concepts and methodological models of film 
phenomenology may encourage students and scholars to develop strategies for the articulation of 
their own cinematic experience. By looking at how phenomenologically inclined theorists reflect 
on their own film experience and personal bodily engagement with film, we have an opportunity 
to work out the tactics for an alternative type of empirical researches based on reflective, non-
abstract awareness of our own presence. Generation of the phenomenological narrative is one of 
the ways to produce sources for an elaboration of new perspectives in both theoretical and 
historical studies, and film criticism. Phenomenological descriptions of sensuous, bodily 
involvement with film may be useful for understanding how films work, communicate meaning 
and can be appropriated by viewers. They also can serve as a source for comparative analysis of 
experiential connection with different types of media, which may shed light on the role and 
functions of these media, transmedial connections, and their historical transformations. In 
historical studies, despite the fact that the contemporary viewer’s experiences of such cinematic 
forms as, for example, a photochemical silent film or film on videotape are significantly different 
from those of the past audiences, emphasis on articulation of immediate, corporeal experience 
through the simple language can reduce the historical gap. For the pedagogical purposes, 
however, it is more important that such kind of phenomenological activities allows rediscovering 
the very idea of the historical gap and the ways we construct the past of media in our classroom 
and research practices. Equally, the introduction of phenomenology helps to switch attention 
from the focus on production of theoretical knowledge about media to the ways how we produce 
this knowledge, what components of real experience we suppress or, on the contrary, foreground, 
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and why we do it. In this regard, phenomenology as a pedagogical tool is important in terms of 
formation of the high level of self-reflexivity. In addition, based on special linguistic operations, 
experimental phenomenology provides us with an opportunity to develop new approaches to 
talking about film and expressing a personal position. The phenomenological language seems to 
be productive not only for deepening the skills necessary in film criticism but also for the 
promotion of a non-conventional form of film criticism. This type of film criticism would be 
grounded in comprehension of a film as a physical phenomenon rather than merely a text or 
aesthetic object.   
Third, and finally, the investigation of the institutional and theoretical basics of film 
phenomenology is directed at the understanding of how critical deconstruction of Western 
logocentrism rest on the hierarchical concepts of race, gender, and class is possible. Film 
phenomenology is one of the alternatives to the bodily politics of the Western culture which 
tends to suppress the body by associating it with the ideas about savagism, femininity and lower-
class origin, on the one hand, and to exclude the perspective of some social groups by connecting 
it with irrational, bodily mode of existence, on the other. Phenomenology rediscovers the 
corporeality as a general and necessary property of human being but not as a marker of “good” 
or “bad” social subject. Meanwhile, it also rejects the essentialist definition of the body and 
acknowledges the variability and flexibility of experiences. Phenomenology does not aim to 
conceptualize the different types of corporeal regimes but as a specific practical directive 
emphasizes that a subject articulating his/her experience needs to reflect on its specificity, 
connection with the concrete cultural environment and personal fate. In this regard, the 
phenomenological project is also a rediscovery of the subject and its intimate being within the 
physical and cultural world. In this regard, it would be important to say that this perspective does 
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not lead to solipsism. On the contrary, another ethical meaning of the phenomenological project 
consists in the restoration of links between the subject and the external world due to focus on 
tangible, experiential materiality of their relations. Equally, film phenomenology intends to 
reconstruct the relationship between the viewer and cinema in their physical interdependence and 
integrity. At the same time, phenomenology, as well as the study of the phenomenological 
program, are not free from ethical pitfalls. As I show it in my work, the phenomenological turn 
in film theory coincided with the formation of new bodily ideologies shaped by demands of the 
advanced capitalism. It poses a question about the influence of economics on the moral 
responsibility of a phenomenologist. Also, even though I do not address this issue specifically, I 
should note that the tendency to associate phenomenology as a philosophical movement and 
approach in film theory exclusively with the Western authors seems problematic. Of course, it 
would be a mistake to consider the Western scholars as necessarily providing the Eurocentric 
perspective. However, their attachment to the Western philosophical traditions and canons 
should be taken into account in the future researches. I must acknowledge that, since my work is 
an introductory study, it relies on the dominant, canonical phenomenological philosophies and 
brackets the suppressed Islamic, Eastern European, Latin American and other alternative currents 
of phenomenological thought. Nevertheless, this limitation of my thesis reveals the possible 
principles film and media scholars can work out to employ in their own sensuous research.  
The primary sources of this thesis can be divided into three groups: (1) the major 
classical and post-classical theoretical works which deal with the issues of (dis)embodied film 
experience and/or embodied nature of the film medium; (2) the texts written by film 
phenomenologists during the 1990s and 2000s; and (3) philosophical works on phenomenology. 
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I refer to the fundamental theoretical texts of the pre-1960s and contemporary film theory 
to identify the differences of phenomenological approach to the film experience as opposed to 
other well-entrenched perspectives to the investigation of this topic. I examine the persistence of 
ocularcentric paradigm and idea of disembodied vision in such works as   Hugo Munsterberg’s 
The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, Rudolf Arnheim’s Film as Art, Béla Balázs’ Theory of 
The Film, Dziga Vertov’s manifesto “Kinoks: A Revolution,” Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” Jean-Louis Baudry’s “Ideological Effects 
of The Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” Christian Metz’s The Imaginary Signifier: 
Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” etc. 
At the same time, I consider Stanley Cavell’s ontology of film and Gilles Deleuze’s theory as 
conceptions which demonstrate closeness to phenomenology bur refuse to promote the radical 
materialism characterizing the theories of the phenomenological turn of the last decades. 
The second group of primary sources plays the crucial role for this thesis. I analyze them 
in the context of conventional division of phenomenology into transcendental and existential 
movements. Thus, Allan Casebier’s Film and Phenomenology. Toward a Realist Theory of 
Cinematic Representation is analyzed as a work representing the transcendetal approach to film 
experience. This approach has not received significant attention within the phenomenological 
turn in film theory and Casebier’s research still remains the only text offering detailed 
conception of this paradigm in film phenomenology. For this reason, I focus on the works 
influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology of embodiment. Vivian Sobchack’s 
pioneering The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience and collection of 
essays Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture are the most essential texts in 
this regard. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these works to contemporary film 
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phenomenology. Sobchack’s concepts of the dialogic film experience, subject-object structure of 
film viewing, and cinematic body constitute the basics of this theoretical movement and seem to 
govern all phenomenological theories of embodied spectatorship. I also focus on the works The 
Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses and Touch: Sensuous 
Theory and Multisensory Media by Laura U. Marks and The Tactile Eye: Touch and the 
Cinematic Experience by Jennifer M. Barker. They offer an insightful phenomenological 
perspective on the embodied spectatorship and materiality of film and formulate the influential 
ideas about tactility of vision and haptic visuality. In addition, I analyze how the fundamental 
theoretical assumptions of film phenomenology are discussed in Jenny Chamarette’s 
Phenomenology and the Future of Film: Rethinking Subjectivity Beyond French Cinema, Jane 
Stadler’s Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience, Narrative Film, and Ethics, and Malin 
Wahlberg’s Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology. Finally, I use such articles as 
Nicholas Chare and Liz Watkins’ “The Matter of Film: Decasia and Lyrical Nitrate,” Alex 
Cobb’s “Cinema of Pre-predication: On Stan Brakhage and the Phenomenology of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty,” Elena Del Rio’s “Alchemies of Thought in Godard’s Cinema: Deleuze and 
Merleau-Ponty” and “The Body of Voyeurism: Mapping a Discourse of the Senses in Michael 
Powell’s Peeping Tom” to demonstrate how film phenomenology can appeal to specific model of 
semiotic research where signification and embodiment, sign and body function as a unity.  
The third group of primary sources is presented by the philosophical texts which 
elaborate concepts and methods of general phenomenology. By paying attention to the works, I 
hope to summarize and clarify such important notions as intentionality, phenomenological 
reduction, phenomenological description, and embodiment. Although these complex notions are 
actively applied by contemporary film phenomenologists, their meaning are often problematic 
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and obscure. Wilhelm Dilthey’s “Fragments for a Poetics,” Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian 
Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology, and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the 
Invisible are those that most fully illuminate the phenomenological terminological apparatus and 
essence of phenomenology as such. 
While talking about the secondary sources of this research, it is important to point out 
that many of texts written by film phenomenologists not only elaborate the basics of film 
phenomenology and exemplify phenomenological studies but also offer a cultural and theoretical 
critique of the phenomenological turn as such. For instance, in her works, Sobchack analyzes the 
state of film academia to justify the necessity of phenomenological approach. Marks, in turn, 
explains how the new media technologies and proliferation of intercultural modes of artistic 
expression are associated with the rise of experiential studies. And Wahlberg delineates the 
epistemological foundations of the phenomenological turn. In this context, the works of those 
authors who are considered to be film phenomenologists can also be applied as secondary 
sources which help us realize the role and determinants of contemporary phenomenological film 
studies. 
The valuable sources which discuss the problems of film phenomenology within film 
studies are Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener’s Film Theory: An Introduction Through the 
Senses, Daniel Frampton’s Filmosophy, Steven Shaviro’s Cinematic Body, Paul Stoller’s 
Sensuous Scholarship, Dudley Andrew’s article “The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology in 
Film Theory,” and Chamarette’s “Embodied Worlds and Situated Bodies: Feminism, 
Phenomenology, Film Theory.” These works not only summarize the main theoretical 
assumptions underlying the phenomenological concepts of sensuous spectatorship and bodily 
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representation but also offer a deep insight into the influence of culture, institutions, and 
philosophy on the phenomenological ideas. 
I pay special attention to the sources dealing with the sociocultural aspects of 
transformation of experience and practices of film viewing. They are Emily Martin’s “The End 
of the Body?”, Tom Gunning’s “Tracing the Individual Body: Photography, Detectives, and 
Early Cinema,” Ben Singer’s “Modernity, Hyperstimulus, and the Rise of Popular 
Sensationalism,” Linda Williams’ “Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess,” Mary Ann 
Doane’s The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive, and 
Francesco Casetti’s The Lumière Galaxy: Seven Key Words For the Cinema To Come. The 
authors of these texts are concerned with the questions of how the new economic, political and 
media environment of the twentieth and twenty first centuries influences the existential being of 
a human and his/her experience of social and artistic life. By following the conclusions made in 
these works, I will try to contextualize the phenomenological turn and to explain what tendencies 
of contemporary life have determined the establishment of film phenomenology. 
Finally, I turn to David R. Cerbone’s book Understanding Phenomenology and Don 
Ihde’s Experimental Phenomenology addressing the history, philosophical transformations, and 
methodology of phenomenology. These sources deal with the role of phenomenology in 
humanities, its advantages as a research program, and pitfalls of phenomenological research. 
In my research, I follow such methods as conceptual analysis, comparative method, and 
discursive analysis. This thesis is a study based on general philosophical examination of the 
conceptual and methodological specificity of film phenomenology. I analyze the key theoretical 
assumptions employed by the phenomenological paradigm and consider how they shed light on 
the complex dynamics of film experience and ontology of film. By applying comparative 
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method, I consider the relationship between film phenomenology and the major film theories, on 
the one hand, and between film phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, on the other. 
Meanwhile, the basic discursive analysis allows me to identify the cultural phenomena and 
practices through which film phenomenology has been constructed. 
The organization of this thesis corresponds to the research objectives formulated above. 
The thesis will be divided into three main chapters.  
Following this introductory chapter is Chapter 2, “Phenomenological Turn in Film 
Theory: Epistemological and Sociocultural Origins”, which presents background examination of 
film phenomenology as a specific epistemological program and institutional phenomenon 
produced by cultural and political changes. In this chapter, I will consider how film 
phenomenology challenges some of the central trajectories of the previous film theory based on 
ocularcentrism, logocentrism, linguistic analogy, and subject-object dichotomy. That is, I will 
describe film phenomenology as a counter-epistemology to epistemological assumptions of film 
studies. I will also explain how the project of film phenomenology has been influenced by 
transformations of media environment and new economic and political programs rooted in 
clashes of cultures of modernity and postmodernity. 
Chapter 3, “Phenomenology as a Research Project of Film Theory: Basic Philosophical 
Concepts and Methodology,” describes the conceptual and methodological connections between 
film phenomenology and phenomenology as philosophy. In this chapter, I will analyze the 
fundamental concepts of general phenomenological research by focusing on how they are 
appropriated by film phenomenologists. I will also deal with the differences between the 
essential movements of Husserl’s transcendental and Merleau-Ponty’s existential 
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phenomenologies and explain how these two paradigms inform film theory on general 
philosophical level. 
In Chapter 4, “Film Phenomenology as the Dialectic of the Seeing and the Seen,” I am 
concerned with the guiding and constitutive formula of phenomenological theory of film – the 
thesis about the reversibility of cinematic perception and expression due to embodied existence 
of the spectator and material situatedness of the film medium. I will summarize and clarify the 
central arguments which support this thesis. I will also discuss how the concept of dialectic of 
perception and expression creates the possibility for semiotic phenomenology as a unique 
approach to film analysis. 
With the basic cultural and epistemological origins of the phenomenological turn 
identified, and the theoretical foundations of film phenomenology clarified, I will move on to the 
concluding chapter where I will summarize the main findings of this thesis and explore 













Chapter 2. Phenomenological Turn in Film Theory: Epistemological and Sociocultural 
Origins 
Academic interest in phenomenology and formation of embodied film theory on its base 
paved the way in the United States in the 1990s. The publication of a seminal issue 
“Phenomenology in Film and Television” by the Quarterly Review of Film and Video in 1990, 
Casebier’s Phenomenology and Film in 1991, and Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye in 1992 
led to a great deal of discussion of the film experience and its corporeal dimensions among film 
and media scholars. Film phenomenology as an alternative theoretical and interpretative program 
attracted even more attention in the 2000s and eventually proved to be not only epistemological 
but also political and ethical project which reformulated agenda of apparatus theory, 
psychoanalytic theory and other important theoretical systems in film studies.    
Referring to the critical gap between actual cinematic experience and existent film 
theories which aim to explain it, film phenomenology marks a decisive departure from the 
accepted paradigm of film scholarship. In the view of film phenomenologists, this paradigm is 
mostly based on the application of ready-made explanatory models to the nature of film 
experience and tends to suppress the lived event of film viewing as such. In addition, determined 
by the logocentric tradition of Western philosophy and its sensory hierarchy, it disregards the 
active role of our bodies. That is, it disregards, as Sobchack notes, the “essential premises of our 
being in the world” (“Is Any Body Home?” 182). This heuristic insufficiency of film theory, 
meanwhile, coincides with general tendency in contemporary culture in which “our bodies have 
become increasingly distanced and alienated, increasingly viewed as “resources,” and 
increasingly lived as “things” to be seen, managed, and mastered” (Sobchack, “Is Any Body 
Home?” 182). Cultural violence toward the living bodies is another concern of film 
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phenomenology that considers the carnal alienation as a strategy of discrimination and 
oppression. 
Given that phenomenology has been established as a counter-epistemology in relation to 
dominant heuristic models in film studies, on the one hand, and as a political practice, on the 
other, it is important to analyze the origins of this theoretical movement within both academic 
discourse of film studies and sociocultural context. In this chapter, I will compare the 
phenomenological approach and basic lines of the classical and post-1960s film theory. I will 
focus on a general phenomenological critique of such widely accepted theoretical assumptions as 
ocularcentrism, logocentrism, linguistic analogy, subject-object dichotomy, and ahistoricism. I 
will also examine the general cultural conditions that influenced the phenomenological turn in 
film theory. In this regard, I am concerned with transformations of media environment and 
economic and political dynamics of modernity and postmodernity.  
 
1. Film Phenomenology as Epistemological Project   
The special status of the phenomenological theory as a new agenda of film studies, first 
of all, has to do with its refusal to follow the ocularcentric paradigm of the classical and post-
1960s theory. Gillian Rose defines ocularcentrism, or “scopic regime,” as a worldview that 
“equates seeing with knowledge” and emphasizes the seeing as the most important of all senses 
(3).  The centrality of vision in the interpretation of both the film medium and the film 
experience used to be taken for granted by critics and scholars and to shape film theory since its 
very beginning. In the 1910s and 1920s, cinema was characterized exclusively as a technology 
that revealed itself as the “appearance” of life (Canudo 62) or a “series of visual impressions” 
(Munsterberg 61).  
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The essentialist-oriented theorists saw the specificity of cinema in its capacity to 
transform our natural perception. Rudolf Arnheim, for instance, considers the reduction of depth, 
lighting, the delimitation of the screen, and the absence of color as factors that allow us to 
digress from the everyday perceptive experience and in doing so to serve as a guarantee of the 
artistic potential of film (Film as Art). Similarly, Béla Balázs recognizes revolutionary 
importance of cinema while referring to the fact that film “showed not other things but the same 
things shown in a different way” and made it possible to identify with cinematic subjects due to 
the situation when “we see what they see and see it as they see it” (48). Walter Benjamin, in turn, 
celebrates the “optical unconscious” which was discovered through cinematic “accentuation of 
hidden details in familiar objects” (37). The Russian formalists proclaim cinema to be a visual 
language based on operation with “visual notions” (Eichenbaum 61) while such Soviet theorist 
and filmmaker as Dziga Vertov insists on “the use of the camera as a kino-eye, more perfect that 
the human eye, for the exploration of the chaos of visual phenomena that fills space” (14-15).  
Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener point out that the ocularcentrism of film theory 
became even more pervasive in the 1960s and 1970s when “apparatus theory transported the 
seeing humans into Plato’s cave, whereas feminist film theory was governed for a long time by 
key words and phrases such as voyeurism, fetishism, exhibitionism and the male gaze” (109). In 
his theory of cinematographic apparatus, Jean-Louis Baudry states that cinema activates vision 
of a transcendental subject, that is, a regime of disembodied, idealized, abstract vision. By 
describing the spectatorial position, he writes: “And if the eye is no longer fettered by a body, by 
the laws of matter and time, if there are no longer any assignable limits to its displacement – 
conditions fulfilled by the possibilities of shooting and of film – the world will not only be 
constituted by this eye but for it” (537). Thus, Baudry emphasizes not only the central role of the 
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eye in the film experience but also constructs his theory of ideological affect through the prism 
of the belief that vision is what constitutes the subject and determines our relations with the 
world. Although Christian Metz is more conscious about various dimensions of cinematic 
perception and treats, for example, hearing as a crucial component of the cinematic experience, 
he still insists that “passion for seeing” establishes the nature of film viewing that is a mirror-like 
communication with the immaterial (51-52). Meanwhile, Mulvey, despite her attempt to specify 
the film experience in terms of male and female bodies, launched the entire tradition of feminist 
criticism focusing on the gendered split of “pleasure in looking” (“Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema” 19). 
Contemporary film phenomenology acknowledges that it would be naïve to deny the 
importance of vision in our experience of cinema. In this light, it criticizes the previous film 
theories not precisely for the privileging of the eye but for the epistemological assumptions and 
procedures this ocularcentric position implies. What Sobchack emphasizes in this regard is that 
the dominant film theories “relate directly to the screen rectangle and to the film as a static 
viewed object, and only indirectly to the dynamic activity of viewing that is engaged in by both 
the film and the spectator, each as viewing subjects” (The Address of the Eye 15). That is, the 
ocularcentric paradigm suggests the dissociation of the viewer and the viewed and suppresses the 
issue of mutual, dialectic exchange between them. One should add that in film theory this 
dissociation, in fact, means disengagement from the material world. As such, vision here holds 
no interest and functions as a means of cognitive, conscious/unconscious activity that occurs 
exclusively inside the viewer.       
The separation of the audience and the film complies with the classical rationalist 
separation of subject and object and with the belief that the distance represents a necessary 
23	
	
condition for cognition. Thus, the heritage of Western epistemology and Western aesthetics, 
where the first proclaims the distance senses to be “vehicles of knowledge” and the latter looks at 
vision and hearing as “vehicles of beauty,” becomes the primary object of phenomenological 
critique (Marks, “Thinking Multisensory Culture” 144). For phenomenologists, the dominance of 
the eye in film theory becomes merely an expression of the authority of this heritage and impulse 
of the intellectual habit that should be critically reevaluated today. 
Why does the alienation of subject from object seem to be an inadequate epistemological 
predisposition according to film phenomenology? The emphasis on the necessity to distinguish 
between the subject and the object and at the same time from the world results in the 
delegitimization of the very category of experience and makes the problem of experience 
irrelevant for understanding both film viewing and film medium. This stance leads us to believe 
that we comprehend and respond to film only metaphysically or cognitively. Also, the film itself 
is deprived of its physical qualities and becomes immaterial essence, a set of codes, signs or 
stimuli. And the act of film viewing is transferred to the sphere of the intelligible. 
The subject-object alienation in the analysis of spectatorship and cinematic medium 
exposes the ubiquitous dichotomy of reason and experience. The constant confrontation of 
idealist and materialist epistemologies marks this dichotomy and at the same time demonstrates 
its contradictions. The dominant approaches to the interpretation of experience were formed in 
ancient Greek philosophy by Plato and Aristotle. Whereas Plato treats the experience as a false 
knowledge based on the trust and acceptance of visibilities, Aristotle makes experience a central 
principle and condition of knowledge. Both philosophers consider experience as a sensory, 
corporeal access to the world via perception, tactility, smell, hearing, etc. 
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Later, this tradition was continued and consolidated by René Descartes and Francis 
Bacon. Descartes, who doesn’t make a distinction between experience and dream, insists that 
only the fact of thinking and our awareness of thinking results in knowledge. By following 
Aristotle, Bacon, in turn, questions the very possibility of knowledge without experience and 
observations. For him, it is only experience which allows us to get information about the world 
and can be a foundation of truth and science. 
What is startling in these debates is that even if philosophers such as Aristotle or 
empiricist Bacon admit experience, they see it as an instrument for generation of knowledge by 
reason. The experience itself, for them, cannot produce knowledge and plays a supplementary 
role in human life. Unlike reason, experience fails to systematize, organize, or generalize, that is 
to complete the procedures that constitute knowledge. Thus, the main contradiction here is that 
there is no principal difference between idealist and materialist epistemologies – both 
philosophical movements tend to suppress experience. 
Most of the leading film theories are inspired by these epistemologies and regard the film 
viewing as an activity of consciousness/unconsciousness whereas the corporeal, enworlded 
experience remains concealed. The rationalization of the film experience in the dominant film 
theory, according to Steven Shaviro, is a demonstration of the persistent anxiety of the Western 
culture in response to affect as such and affect engendered by visual forms. He concludes that 
“Film theory endeavors to subdue and regulate the visual, to destroy the power of images, or at 
least to restrain them within the bounds of linguistic discursivity and patriarchal Law” (Shaviro 
29). In this regard, the ocularcentric division “the viewer/the film” and concept of vision as a 
disembodied sense connected to consciousness seem to be culturally informed strategies 
allowing to restrain the disturbing in its irrationality presence of experience. 
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The accepted epistemologies of film theory alleviate this anxiety through the 
dematerialization, disembodiment of both film and film viewing. The language here becomes an 
ideal model for the procedure of rationalization. It plays an essential role as a tool of explanation 
and serves as a prototype of interaction between the audience and cinema. Film viewing is 
considered as an encounter with a semiotic system where abstract, arbitrary entities of signs 
dictate our relationship with the image. Meanwhile, language is what can be seen as opposition 
to experience at the ontological level. “We have language in order not to have experience” (11), 
Franklin K. Ankersmit writes. For him, language is the symbolic matrix, the “shield” against the 
world as given us in experience. Experience “exceeds concepts and even language itself” and 
serves as “a marker for what is so ineffable and individual (or specific to a particular group) that 
it cannot be rendered in conventionally communicative terms” (Ankersmit 5). 
Language understood in the Saussurean sense is a socially constructed set of rigorous 
norms and rules of using symbols for communication. It is always a pre-established knowledge, 
unlike speech that is situational and can defy normative structures. Thus, the analogy between 
language and film, which has remained extremely influential in the entire development of film 
theory, presupposes that we receive knowledge from film and construct meaning on its base. 
This analogy disregards experiential, non-symbolic knowledge born through the material 
interaction between the human body and film. The persistence of linguistic models of film 
theories is one of the primary objects of phenomenological critique. As Sobchack notes, “part of 
the appeal of phenomenology lies in its potential for opening up and destabilizing language in 




The isolation of the subject and rationalization of film experience are insufficient 
epistemological strategies for film phenomenology not only because these assumptions obscure 
the real situation of film viewing through the split of mind and body. Their inadequacy also deals 
with the fact that they, on the one hand, disregard reflexive awareness of the theorist’s position 
and, on the other, lead to ahistorical and acultural perspective in an analysis.  
Applied to the interpretation of the film experience and ontology of film, the rationalist 
predispositions are equally influential in a definition of the scholar stance. In the dominant film 
theory, the scholars remain distanced from his or her body. It reveals itself in the elimination of 
intimate impressions and constructing idealistic, abstract linguistic narrative in theory. “Stiffened 
from long sleep in the background of scholarly life, the scholar’s body yearns to exercise its 
muscles. Sleepy from long inactivity, it aches to restore its sensibilities” (xi-xii), Paul Stoller 
writes, while referring to the persistent invisibility of the scholar’s corporeality and sensitivity. 
The acceptance of sensuousness is what film phenomenology insists on, as opposed to classical 
rationalism striving to exclude or delegitimize presence of researcher as a living, enworlded 
subject.  
In this regard, Sobchack underlines the role of phenomenology as the inherently different 
research approach that interrupts the tradition of dependence on “received knowledge” and 
emphasizes that film scholar needs to acknowledge that “we dwell on the ground of experience 
before moving on to more abstract or theoretical concerns, that we experience and reflect upon 
our own sight before we (…) cite others” (“Fleshing Out the Image” 193). Thus, 
phenomenological epistemology, in fact, makes an effort to restore experience along with the 
subjectivity of scholar. It foregrounds the importance of the inner life and the personal. As 
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Ankersmit puts it, “the rediscovery of experience is also the rediscovery of the subject, and vice 
versa” (2).  
Besides, the redemption of the scholar’s bodily, lived experience becomes an essential 
condition for understanding the cultural and social forces which inform our research. The 
connection with the matter, rejection of isolation from the world allow a researcher to be more 
responsible and conscious about the environment that surrounds him or her and certain 
established conventions that determine our experience and studies. Unlike the top-down analytic 
models which reduce the scholar to a bearer of prior knowledge and unreflexively impose the 
pre-established “Grand” theoretical schemata upon the object of study, the phenomenological 
perspective in film theory aims to make this pre-given knowledge visible by analyzing its 
coexistence with experience and their respective interconnection. 
Phenomenological attitude does not presuppose the reversal bottom-up movement to the 
formulation of all-encompassing theory either. It insists on the irrelevance of the hierarchical 
paradigm of thinking as such. The rediscovery of the subject is directed exactly at the 
destabilization of existent epistemological hierarchies based on the deductive/inductive 
reasoning. The subject here is not an epistemological benchmark. He/she acquires the voice not 
to construct some complete, finished generalization of phenomena on the basis of personal 
experience. The subject’s task is to reflect on his or her own corporeal existence within the world 
and physical connection with knowledge and culture. This reflection becomes the first step 
toward an understanding of “local epistemologies” (Stoller 4) which are multiple, diverse, 
competing paradigms of knowledge generated by class, gender, race, and cultural heritage in a 
broader sense. Film phenomenology focuses on the mutability of subjective embodied 
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experience and these epistemologies and emphasizes the ways by which this mutability manifests 
itself.  
In this relation, it is not accidental that two principal sources of the epistemology of 
sensuous scholarship and embodied film theories are feminism and post-structuralism (Stoller 
xiii). Feminist and post-structuralist philosophies have made a significant contribution to 
phenomenological film theory by providing a deepened insight into how lenses of culture shape 
experience, knowledge, and subject. Like phenomenology, these movements challenge the 
rationalist logic of difference and reevaluate the distinction between mind and body, self and the 
world. This category of division which seems to be ontologically and epistemologically 
unreliable for the phenomenological tradition is deprived of its neutrality in a social, political and 
axiological sense in feminism and post-structuralism. The body, meanwhile, often serves as a 
primary tool and starting point in this critique of division and difference. 
Film phenomenologists are actively engaged in a dialogue with feminist and post-
structuralist philosophers. This engagement, in turn, effectively reinforces the fundamental 
orientation of phenomenological program to both epistemological, experiential, and cultural self-
reflexivity. Thus, following Judith Butler, Sobchack, who draws on Merleau-Ponty’s theory in 
her interpretation of embodied spectatorship, is forced to acknowledge the “sexual Cartesianism” 
and patriarchal origins of this theory (The Address of the Eye 150). By criticizing Jean 
Baudrillard's concept of techno-body, she also analyzes the “dimensions of prosthetic pleasure,” 
her own experience of being an “incomplete” body and how this experience influences her as a 
spectator (“Beating the Meat”). At the same time, Chamarette emphasizes that, despite the 
significant presence of women in the field, film phenomenology rests on the “masculine” version 
of phenomenological philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty while ignoring the 
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heritage of Simone de Beauvoir, Hannah Arendt, Martha Nussbaum and other feminist 
phenomenologists (“Embodied Worlds” 291). The male phenomenologies, in turn, are not 
devoid of inclination for universalization and retention of conventional philosophical language 
developed within the classic tradition. Another example is Marks who finds the concept of 
rhizomatic thinking offered by Gilles Deleuze and Pierre-Félix Guattari an efficient model to 
challenge persistence of Euro-American rationalism and Eurocentrism in the discussion about 
the film experience (The Skin of the Film xvii). 
These important references to feminism and post-structuralist philosophy prove not only 
the willingness of film phenomenology to reflect on its heuristic operations and cultural 
embeddedness. They also demonstrate that, unlike logocentric epistemologies oriented 
exclusively at the production of “true” knowledge, film phenomenology tends to emphasize its 
social and ethical responsibility in the analysis of film spectatorship.  
Dudley Andrew in his famous 1978 article The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology in 
Film Theory noted that 
from the most primitive descriptions of the peculiarities of perception in cinema, to our 
emotional involvement in the image, to the momentum of a narrative, to the constitution 
of a cinematic world, to the description of types of worlds (genres) and to the life of our 
interpretation of them, phenomenology claims to be closer, not necessarily to truth, but to 
cinema and our experience of it (632). 
Thus, the phenomenology of film brackets the questions about the true nature of film and true 
nature of viewer’s position (which was the main reason of suppression of phenomenological 
approach in film studies).  Instead, it assumes that there are numerous forms of knowledge and 
experience. The description, articulation of embodied process of film viewing, in turn, helps us 
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understand how this diversity is possible, what mechanisms underlie delegitimization and 
neutralization of multiplicity, and why subjectivity still matters. 
In this regard, it would be a mistake to consider the establishment of film phenomenology 
as an alternative epistemological project in film studies independently from cultural and social 
processes shaping the understanding of the human being today. 
 
2. Film Phenomenology as Cultural and Political Paradigm  
In their analysis of contemporary film theory, Elsaesser and Hagener point out that the 
development of phenomenological studies has been driven by the media environment. For them, 
the phenomenological assumptions (the dialogic correlation between subject and object and 
active bodily investment of human beings in communication with the world) correspond with the 
logic of new media spectacles that “require participating onlookers, voluntarily enforced 
exhibitionism and performative masquerade” (109). Indeed, the development of digital forms of 
visual culture, social media, video games and media exploiting the sensorium of augmented 
reality, on the one hand, and changing conventions of exhibition and distribution, on the other, 
have redefined connection between the spectator and the media resulting in reinforcement of 
participatory mode of engagement and reversibility. 
The old dream about the merging of the spectator and cinematic apparatus appears to go 
outside the domain of aesthetic metaphors and theoretical conceptualization. Now this 
utopian/dystopian myth is coming true. The omnipresence of visual media in human life along 
with the enhanced technological and symbolic interaction between media technology and a man 
have challenged the positioning of the viewer as a passive and fixed consumer. It is no less 
important that these new circumstances have destabilized ocularcentrism of modernist film 
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thought. The “looking” spectator has made way for the corporeal spectator whose entire body 
and senses are active, dynamic and intense.  
With regard to the new circumstances of media production, it should also be said that 
today we are witnessing a “boom” in the field of the sensuous imagery as such. The proliferation 
of such genres as melodrama, horror, and pornography and elaboration of more corporeally 
appealing cinematic sensorium in these films have made the body’s involvement more visible 
and accessible. In her famous 1991 essay, Williams calls these types of cinema “bodily genres” 
and characterizes them as “low” films based on “bodily excess,” “ecstasy,” and suppression of 
language (7). It is notable, however, that these genres have been legitimized as ones possessing 
artistic potential and social significance in the culture of 2000s. Moreover, the features Williams 
attributes to bodily films are actively exploited in a variety of contemporary cinematic contexts, 
including experimental and art film.  
Another significant aspect of this cultural visibility of body is that today we deal with 
visibility of multiple bodies and corporeal regimes. The easier access to technology and changes 
in approaches to distribution in the conditions of global capital and cyberculture have 
undermined a closed nature of cinematic production. The corporeality of gender minorities, 
numerous ethnic, racial and religious groups and classes have become an essential part of the 
imagery generated by contemporary media. Although the approach to representation and 
participation of these social groups in the dominant media is still radically problematic, 
collaborative nature of the transnational media industry allows producing media texts that are not 
culturally hermetic and reflect the coexistence of various cultural identities. Meanwhile, social 
media and video-sharing platforms make it possible to distribute the content produced by 
independent users who belong to different cultural environments and expose their material 
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presence through images. Finally, today the consumers are actively involved in the process of 
reorganization and remaking of the products promoted by official, normative media. Fans, artists, 
and political activists employ such practices as remixing, re-editing and rewriting. These 
practices bring to light the hidden materiality of media that are not symbolic, bodiless texts but 
products existing in physical form and bearing a material trace of their creators. Here, the 
materiality of both the producer and medium reveals itself as a site of struggle between various 
political and social forces and marks the specificity of the current cultural processes. 
In this light, it is not surprising that phenomenology which is deeply concerned with the 
existential role of bodily experience has become a proper theoretical model that could explain 
these new conditions of interaction with media where seeing does not represent the dominant 
form of bodily involvement, the spectator and media function as a whole, and visibility of body 
is exaggerated. 
As argued above, the transformations of media culture might be considered factors which 
have accelerated and stimulated the establishment of the phenomenological approach in film and 
media studies. These phenomena have exposed the impossibility to ignore phenomenology in the 
context of apparent changes of media experiences and corporeality. Meanwhile, it might be said 
that the phenomenological turn in film theory of the 1990s has been prepared by the entire 
history of mechanical visual forms connected with real economic and political processes in the 
epochs of modernity and postmodernity. Phenomenology as a study of experience was crucial for 
understanding the experiential reorganization achieved through film and photography and 
initiated by the development of capitalism. 
Tom Gunning treats the advent of these visual forms as an essential part of “new 
configuration of experience” shaped by both economic transformations of the Industrial 
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Revolution of the late nineteenth century and transformations of everydayness marked by 
urbanization, mass production, and new patterns of communication (15). The emergent form of 
experience, or the “drama of modernity,” as he puts it, revealed itself in  
a collapsing of previous experiences of space and time through speed; an extension of the 
power and productivity of the human body; and a consequent transformation of the body 
through new thresholds of demand and danger, creating new regimes of bodily discipline 
and regulation based upon a new observation of (and knowledge about) the body (16). 
Thus, for Gunning, the experiential metamorphoses of modernity are first and foremost to be 
conceived regarding alternative bodily positioning and social discourse about the body. Mary 
Ann Doane also refers to the importance of the issue of bodily experience by stating that “While 
in classical thought meaning precedes and determines embodiment, in modernity meaning is 
associated with immanence and embodiment” (10). For her, modernity rediscovered body and 
made it an instrument for meaning-production.  
Photography and film have influenced the reorganization of experience and corporeality 
through various mechanisms in a significant way. These media were able to present what 
Gunning called “an experience of global tourism”: an experience of deconstructing spatial 
barriers through visualizing both the connection between remote places and velocity of spatial 
travel (16). This elimination of spatial stability was experienced together with disrupted 
temporality which now promised “immortality, the denial of the radical finitude of the human 
body, access to other temporalities” (Doane 2). 
According to Doane, the photographic and cinematic technologies have become 
instruments of resistance to the rationalization of advanced capitalism grounded in the ideals of 
purpose, control, and stability. They promote contingency and ephemerality and exclude the 
general by foregrounding the particular. However, for her, this resistance is not deprived of 
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ambiguity and ideologically can serve to reinforce capitalism or at least “to make tolerable an 
incessant rationalization” (11). Similar idea has been discussed by Gunning who proposes that 
the mechanical media engage in the controversies of modern capitalism that “contains a tension 
between forces which undo older forms of stability in order to increase the ease and rapidity of 
circulation and of those forces which seek to control and make such circulation predictable and, 
therefore, profitable” (19).    
It seems plausible to claim that the ambiguity of ideological role of the technologies of 
representation lies in their experiential and bodily politics rooted in dialectics of pleasure and 
anxiety. On the one hand, cinema and photography constitute fascination with limitless 
possibilities of experience. The spectatorial pleasure derives from both indexicality of these 
media and its deconstruction through the restructuring of the world’s materiality. On the other 
hand, the same factors cause the bodily anxiety. As Doane underscores, the cinematic 
exploitation of the familiar and the indexical represents the “disturbing potential of 
meaninglessness, of providing the spectator with nothing to read” (63). This means, in turn, that 
all communication might be reduced to the bodily experience. Cinema potentially allows the 
body to acquire the total control over the non-symbolized cinematic message. However, the 
deconstructive role of film and photography emancipating materiality from human everyday 
perception results in the dissociation of the inner life from the body. The spectator distrusts his or 
her own senses and becomes alienated from the corporeal.  
As already noted, this abrupt instability of experience and the matter may support and at 
the same time subvert existent social structures of power, but it always seems to be incorporated 
in the system of contemporary power relations. The spectator’s alienation from the body and 
growing suspicion about sensory experience permit capitalist rationalization and efficiency. In 
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this case, the viewer is constructed as the “Fordist body,” to borrow Emily Martin’s term, which 
exists within the model of “hierarchical pyramids with the brain firmly located at the top and the 
other organs ranged below” (122). For Martin, this type of body is easily subject to control and 
standardization. It functions within the logic of abstractness which is a mark of capitalist 
thinking, according to Siegfried Kracauer (“The Mass Ornament”). Meanwhile, the reverse 
model of the corporeality, where it is not suppressed but emphasized and where its flexibility and 
situatedness are dramatized, refers to more contemporary forms of capitalism. Martin argues that 
emphasis of the late capitalism on “technological innovation, specificity, and rapid, flexible 
change” requires formation of shaky, uncertain identities ready to function in the world of global 
capital (123). The body, in turn, becomes a tool and discursive referent which destabilizes the 
identities.  
Although Martin classifies corporeality according to major historical trajectories of 
development of capitalism, she also underscores that their coexistence is possible. Ben Singer, in 
his turn, suggests avoiding a sharp division between modernity and postmodernity regarding 
discussion of the transformation of experience. He notes that whereas a phenomenal world of 
modernity is often described as “markedly quicker, more chaotic, fragmented, and disorienting 
than in previous phases of human culture,” we also can find the same descriptions of postmodern 
experience (73). That is, both modernity and postmodernity are experienced in culture as 
experiential traumas. 
The phenomenological turn in film theory of the 1990s is one of the responses to this 
sensuous shock of modernity and postmodernity. Phenomenology tries to articulate the role of 
cinema in the economic and political reformulation of the body. While analyzing the 
simultaneous existence of practices of bodily suppression and liberation, it situates the 
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corporeality in the context of media production and consumption. It is important to note, 
however, that phenomenology itself becomes a political project which also reproduces the 
ambiguity of advanced capitalism. It celebrates bodily multiplicity and emancipation of “non-
normative” bodies in terms of gender, sexuality, race, and class. But by legitimizing the variety 
and flexibility of experiences, it also promotes the ideal of the human body constructed by the 
postmodern capitalist system for its own purposes. At the same time, the phenomenological 
impulse may be interpreted as a form of modernist capitalist rationalization necessary in the 
contemporary situation when we deal with “bodily excess” and directed at gaining control over 

















Chapter 3. Phenomenology as a Research Project of Film Theory: Basic Concepts and 
Methodology 
The phenomenological turn marks a decisive revision of the most fundamental 
assumptions accepted by the previous film theory, including the essentialist approach to the 
ontology of cinema, logocentric perspective to the understanding of the viewer’s activity, and 
ahistorical depiction of both spectatorship and film as a medium. Meanwhile, film 
phenomenology does not constitute a single movement that unites scholars who share the same 
theoretical models and methodological apparatus. Instead of talking about film phenomenology, 
as Chamarette suggests, it would be more pertinent to talk about film phenomenologies which 
are “hybrid, flexible, lucid, pliable approaches toward a form of image-making and material 
medium that is in itself also hybrid, unstable, and constantly evolving” (“Embodied Worlds” 
293). 
Indeed, whereas we identify such scholars as, for instance, Casebier (1991), Stadler 
(2008), or Barker (2009) as film phenomenologists, it is impossible to ignore the significant 
differences in the way they interpret the film experience and formulate research questions. 
Casebier elaborates what he calls a “realist theory” of cinematic representation and considers the 
spectatorial activity as the discovery process directed by cinematic devices. Stadler examines the 
viewer’s experience as an evaluative process shaped by the ethics corporeally manifested in the 
cinematic narrative. And, for Barker, the specificity of this experience lies not in the narrative or 
cinematic techniques but in the space between the screen and us, that is in the feeling of 
simultaneous distance and proximity. These scholars follow different models of the 
phenomenological investigation, have a different level of self-reflexivity, and use different 
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language which can be terminologically sophisticated (Casebier) or metaphorical, sensuous and 
even mystical (Barker). 
However, film phenomenologies exemplifying the growing interest of film theory to 
philosophy (as opposed to adherence to art criticism, literary theory, sociology, and cognitive 
sciences) are derived from the specific intellectual tradition set by German and French 
phenomenological movements. And although film phenomenologies “retain a looseness and 
lightness of foot” (Chamarette, “Embodied Worlds” 290) in following this tradition, there is a set 
of concepts, premises, and methods shared by various phenomenological studies of the film 
experience and philosophical phenomenology. The grounding of these studies in this 
philosophical paradigm is what makes film phenomenology a recognizable current in the 
contemporary film theory.  
In this chapter, I will focus on such fundamental concepts of phenomenology as 
experience, intentionality, and phenomenological reduction. I will examine phenomenological 
description as the basic method for investigation of experiences and consider its implication. In 
addition, I will delineate between the essential movements of Husserl’s transcendental and 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenologies and explain how these two paradigms inform film 
theory at the general philosophical level.  
In his Filmosophy, Daniel Frampton describes phenomenology as “the philosophy of 
experience – the study of consciousness and the phenomena (objects/appearance) of direct 
experience. That is, it attempts to describe our experience of things (the appearance of things to 
us), marking out phenomenal states – also known as sensations, sense data or qualia” (39). This 
definition refers to one of the most fundamental and interdependent premises of 
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phenomenological framework, namely, intentionality, a method of phenomenological 
description, and embodiment. 
Before exploring the role of these concepts in phenomenological research of experience 
and the film experience, in particular, it is necessary to examine how phenomenologists 
understand experience as such. Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the pioneers of phenomenology, 
characterizes experience as a mode of existence in which “reality is there-for-me” (223). He 
explains that the reality of experience is there-for-me “because I have a reflexive awareness of it, 
because I possess it immediately as belonging to me in some sense” (223). That is, the 
experience is not something perceived or given to us but a particular existential position in which 
the recognition of the independence of the world and the feeling of connection with it coincide. 
Experience manifests itself as an inseparability of our consciousness, sensations, and impressions 
from the reality to which they are directed. Husserl develops this view by stating that experience 
is “whatever is to be found in the stream of experience” (Ideas 120). This paradoxical definition 
implies that experience as a subjective activity is identical with the experienced reality. 
Although the reality of experience needs to be recognized by the subject and seems to 
belong to us, it is always something that exists separately from our subjectivity. This reality 
represents a content of experience and, thus, constitutes a connection between the subjective and 
the objective. As Husserl writes, “perceiving is the perceiving of something, maybe a thing; 
judging, the judging of a certain matter; valuation, the valuing of a value; wish, the wish for the 
content wished, and so on” (Ideas 243). This unique property of experience to be the 
“consciousness of something” (Husserl, Ideas 242) is what he calls intentionality. 
For phenomenologists, intentionality as the directedness of experience to an object is a 
basic structure and fundamental grounding of any experience. Every act of experience possesses 
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some quality of intentionality even if it is not intentional in itself. Thus, as Husserl points out, the 
experience of “whiteness” is not a consciousness of something. It is a hidden part of the 
experience, which cannot be identified immediately and directly. However, sensory feelings, 
such as the experience of color, taste, sound, touch, and so on, are bearers of intentionality, 
“components in concrete experiences of a more comprehensive kind which as wholes are 
intentional” (Husserl, Ideas 247). Moreover, the sensuous experience becomes a condition for 
the formation of intentionality, for establishing the mutability between subject and object.  
Thus, intentionality refers to the following three critical phenomenological assumptions: 
(1) experience reveals itself as an impossibility to separate the subject from the object; (2) the 
division between mind and sensory body is impossible; and (3) although not every sensuous 
experience is intentional, every intentional experience is sensuous. 
In film phenomenology, intentionality is an essential concept that determines theoretical 
and methodological investigation of the film experience. The spectator’s consciousness which is 
always consciousness of a film constitutes interaction and unity of the viewer and cinematic 
reality. As Barker writes, film phenomenology treats the viewer and film as “intimately related 
but not identical, caught up in a relationship of intersubjectivity and co-constitution, rather than 
as subject and object positioned on opposite sides of the screen” (13).  In the same vein, 
Sobchack argues that the film viewing is “a dialogic exchange between the viewing subjects who 
share the finite and situated conditions of objective embodiment and also share their uniquely 
and finite existence in a common, if contested, cultural world” (“The Address of the Eye” 307). 
Meanwhile, for Shaw, the film experience is a “Janus-face alternation,” a “subject-object 
correlation that switches back and forth like a fusing mirror” (23). 
41	
	
One of the most important preconditions of the phenomenological study of experience 
through the prism of intentionality is an employment of descriptive method. A phenomenological 
description of experiences implies exclusion of all evaluations, judgments, and opinions about 
the analyzed object. The phenomenological restoration of the integrity of subject and object 
through descriptive approach also presupposes the elimination of any explanatory and theoretical 
perspective. As Husserl points out, in phenomenological studies “we stand bodily aloof from all 
theories, and by “theories” we here mean anticipatory ideas of every kind. Only as facts of our 
environment, not as agencies for uniting facts validly together, do theories concern us at all” 
(Ideas 105-106). Thus, theories as the pre-knowledge are of interest to the phenomenologist only 
in terms of their belonging to the experience of the world. That is, they become an object of 
phenomenology as phenomena of our experience and product of consciousness but not as an 
epistemological tool or epistemological goal. 
Description serves here as an attempt to bring our immediate experience of the world 
back, to “return to that world prior to knowledge of which knowledge speaks, and with regard to 
which every scientific determination is abstractive, dependent and a sign” (Merleau-Ponty “What 
is Phenomenology?” 60). For phenomenology, the experiencing subject possesses the limitless 
authority in the study of experience and the world given in it. The very fact of the existence 
provides the subject with this authority. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty writes,  
I am the absolute source. My existence does not come from my antecedents or my 
physical and social entourage, but rather goes toward them and sustains them. For it is I 
that make exist for myself (…) that tradition which I chose to adopt or that horizon whose 
distance from me tends to disappear, since it would have no such property as distance 
were I not there to view it. (“What is Phenomenology?” 60) 
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From this perspective, it may appear that phenomenology is committed to anti-constructionist 
stance and disregards historical and socio-cultural factors as determinants of subjectivity. 
However, it is important to note that what Merleau-Ponty underscores is the fact that these 
factors would be meaningless without the presence of the subject. In phenomenology, the 
emphasis on the subject’s immediate experience as it is, as opposed to the emphasis on the 
analysis of cultural and epistemological meanings of the experience, is based on the belief that 
these meanings acquire their power only due to our existential capacity to be, to have experience 
and therefore to accept and develop them.  
Film phenomenologies also prioritize the subject. They aim to express the film 
experience through the description of the lived impressions, senses, and conscious attitudes of 
the viewer, while avoiding explanation of their origins and features which are not recognized by 
the spectator and have no direct relation to the very experiential event. They are guided by the 
necessity to suspend theoretical, scientific and cultural knowledges about the film medium and 
spectatorial activity. Nevertheless, film phenomenologists do not ignore their relationship with 
the social environment. The significant difference of film phenomenology in comparison with 
other strategies of studying the film experience lies in the attempt to identify the ways this 
environment influences not our experience of film but our research. While referring to the 
research self-reflexivity, Stadler notes that it is impossible to eliminate all preconceptions but, as 
phenomenologists, “we can at least try to become aware of how they inform our understanding 
by admitting, examining, and critically accounting for them” (40). It makes sense to say that film 
phenomenology tries to recover the film experience as it is by focusing on the very act of talking 
about it and by identifying our pre-given knowledges in the articulation of our experience.    
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This raises concerns about the language film phenomenologists use in their descriptions 
of the film experience. Don Ihde, whose classical work Experimental Phenomenology first 
published in 1979 has become an essential guide for Sobchack’s seminars on film 
phenomenology, notes that the main difficulty of the descriptive approach as well as any 
linguistic reflection on experience is an inevitability of “confusion of immediacy with 
nonexperienced elements presumed or posited in explanations” (20).  His example of such kind 
of confusion is a phrase “I see red and black stimuli on my retina” in describing the ladybug, 
where reference to physiological stimulation and scientific terminology function as an obstacle 
for true phenomenological description. In this regard, Ihde emphasizes that by describing 
appearances we should express the experience of them in simple, ordinary language. This is not a 
guarantee of successful phenomenological description. Nevertheless, the using of ordinary 
language can reduce the risk of reliance on prior knowledge in description. 
The requirement to apply descriptive approach relates to the next important concept, 
namely, reduction, which is one of the most problematic notions in phenomenology. As noted 
above, the descriptive approach is considered in phenomenology as a practical method that 
allows to distinguish genuinely experiential phenomena from knowledges and preconceptions 
received from science and formed by sociocultural environment. This epistemological 
“bracketing” of presuppositions is what Husserl called phenomenological reduction. 
In phenomenology, there is no general consensus on the concept of phenomenological 
reduction. At issue in the debates on this notion is the possibility and limits of its application as a 
practical guideline in phenomenological study of experiences. The difference of approaches to 
the operation of reduction constitutes the main criterion for division phenomenology into two 
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fundamental philosophical movements: transcendental phenomenology and existential 
phenomenology. Phenomenology of film can also be seen in terms of this division. 
Transcendental phenomenology of film follows the Husserlian tradition of “pure” 
phenomenology which studies transcendental experience defined as self-directed consciousness, 
“purely internal experience, experience of one’s own conscious life” (Husserl, Cartesian 
Meditations 32). For Husserl, this study requires absolute phenomenological reduction. He 
describes it as an operation “split up into different steps of ‘disconnection’” from our natural 
standpoint (Husserl, Ideas 114). These steps include not only “bracketing” of epistemological 
preconceptions and social knowledges but also “bracketing” of the subject as such. David R. 
Cerbone explains that the Husserlian reduction implies removing the assumption that “I am a 
worldly, materially real human being just as much as I do the assumption that my experience is 
taking place within a materially real world” (33). From this perspective, the subject becomes a 
transcendental essence, pure consciousness freed from the surrounding reality. The 
transcendental phenomenology focuses on how one can be aware of this consciousness. It tries to 
describe how experience can be about something and how the experience of something is 
possible. Similarly, the transcendental phenomenology of film describes in what way our 
experience can be about film and how the cinematic experience as a form of conscious activity 
can exist.  
The idealistic stance of transcendental phenomenology and its total disregard of 
embodied and sociocultural dimensions of experience have made it an unpopular research 
initiative in film studies. Nevertheless, the first attempts to apply phenomenological approach to 
study of film were inspired exactly by the transcendental paradigm. 
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Thus, under the influence of transcendental phenomenology, Münsterberg formulates the 
object and approach of his film theory as follows: 
we turn to the photoplay, at first with a purely psychological interest, and ask for the 
elementary excitements of the mind which enter into our experience of the moving 
pictures. (…) We approach the art of the film theater as if it stood entirely on its own 
ground, and extinguish all memory of the world of actors. We analyze the mental 
processes which this specific form of artistic endeavor produces in us (45).   
Whereas in his study Münsterberg is more concerned with the principles of gestalt psychology 
and behaviorism, the Husserlian phenomenology informs much of his film theory. The theorist 
makes an attempt to isolate film as a content of experience from all possible associations with the 
surrounding world. He brackets the presuppositions about film as art, medium and profilmic 
reality, and considers the spectator as a pure, independent mind. Moreover, as Noël Carroll 
points out, Münsterberg not only disconnects the spectator’s mind from the material world but 
contrasts them because the mind “overcomes what he calls the forms of the outer world, namely 
space, time, and causality” (493). 
We also find the influence of transcendental phenomenology in Russian formalist film 
theory which considers the film experience as an autonomous conscious act. Russian formalists, 
mostly Eichenbaum, developed the idea according to which cinematic experience is reflexive. 
Eichenbaum argues that the audience in cinema performs the “inverse process of reading” which 
presupposes the movement from an object towards the conscious experience of it as a formation 
of “inner speech” (61). Viktor Shklovsky and Yuri Tynianov place great emphasis on this 
phenomenon as well, but they are more interested in cinematic ostranenie (defamiliarization). 
The purpose of defamiliarization in image, as	Shklovsky puts it, “is not to draw our 
understanding closer to that which this image stands for, but rather to allow us to perceive the 
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object in a special way, in short, to lead us to a “vision” of this object rather than mere 
“recognition” (10). For him, ostranenie, or making the experience of objects strange, is what 
makes cinematic experience possible. Meanwhile, this possibility manifests itself only through 
the work of decontextualized spectatorial consciousness.   
The turning point in the development of transcendental phenomenology of film is a 
publication of Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (1971). 
Although this work inherits many assumptions of analytic philosophy, Cavell develops a genuine 
phenomenological interpretation of cinema. He examines the film experience in the spirit of 
transcendentalism which becomes apparent not only on the level of methodology but also on the 
level of theoretical conclusions. Cavell separates the spectator from the conditions of material 
and cultural reality. At the same time, he argues that this separation is a necessary condition for 
the very act of film viewing. As the philosopher notes, since we cannot participate in the world 
depicted and since this world reveals itself due to mechanical non-human recreation, the 
cinematic experience becomes a new form of our connection with the world by our 
disconnection from it. As he writes, in cinema “objects participate in the photographic presence 
of themselves; they participate in the re-creation of themselves on film; they are essential in the 
making of their appearances” (Cavell xvi). This independence of the physical world of cinema 
results in alienation of consciousness from the object.  
Another prominent representative of the transcendental phenomenology of the film is 
Casebier whose Film and Phenomenology (1991) became one of the first works where Husserl 
and his philosophical conception were discussed in the context of film theory. In his work, 
Casebier describes the possibilities of phenomenology for film theory and delineates the issues it 
can help to analyze. He defines phenomenological approach as “a way of looking at the same 
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time at both subject and object in the cognitive act while maintaining the object of the act as 
existing independently” (4). The aspiration for positioning of the object independently as well as 
emphasis on experience as the cognitive act is what, according to Casebier, allows 
phenomenology to provide “the needed realist framework” for film theory. Meanwhile, this 
idealistic striving for restoration of reality through pure objectivity is what characterizes 
transcendental phenomenology. 
As mentioned above, the phenomenological reduction was introduced as one of the most 
crucial concepts for phenomenology, but it has also become the reason for the disintegration of 
phenomenological movement. Today, the question regarding what should be bracketed is solved 
by scholars in different ways. The radical reductionism of transcendental phenomenology has 
been rejected not only by philosophers but also by film scholars. This is one of the reasons why 
this field was overshadowed by more flexible and open existential phenomenology. 
While anti-naturalistic transcendental phenomenology excludes the questions about the 
reality of objects and empiric and psychological factors affecting consciousness, existential 
phenomenologists dispute this model and offer alternatives. Existential phenomenologists deny 
the possibility of transcendental consciousness and insist that a human cannot be separated and 
analyzed independently from the world. Thus, existential phenomenology makes it possible to 
explore experience in non-transcendental terms and opens the opportunity for a combination of 
phenomenology with social and cultural studies. 
Nevertheless, the widespread tendency to unify existential movement also contradicts its 
real pluralism. Following Cerbone, one can signify the Heideggerian structuring phenomenology 
of being, “subjective” phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of embodiment (Understanding Phenomenology).  While the first two 
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paradigms were not favored with significant attention among film scholars, Merleau-Ponty’s 
ideas about the embodied perception and interconnection of mind and body are praised by 
numerous film theorists. Today, this approach of existential phenomenology represents the 
dominating research strategy in phenomenological research of cinema. In this regard, Stadler 
even notes that “the emphasis placed on the perceptual engagement of the physical body, rather 
than on the conscious or subconscious mind, or the sociopolitical body” can be considered to be 
“the most significant contribution of phenomenology to film theory” (44). 
For Merleau-Ponty, the Husserlian phenomenological reduction represents the main 
contradiction of the study of experience. The intention of transcendental phenomenology to 
reduce experience to the act of pure consciousness implies that mind, and the therefore 
experiential activity, is something universal and structurally identical for every subject. This 
returns phenomenology back to the sphere of scientific epistemology based on the construction 
of unities and essences. Moreover, the assumption that we can behave as an absolute 
consciousness removes the problematic of the reduction as such. That is, if we accept the 
possibility of independence of our mind from the world, the operation of bracketing loses its 
sense. Another problem of this type of reduction is that experience acquires features of 
“meaning-giving operation,” and “the world is nothing but ‘world-as-meaning’” (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception xii). Whereas this cognitivist and semiotic perspective can indeed 
accompany phenomenological investigation, it cannot be a point of departure for understanding 
the experience. 
In her phenomenology of film, Sobchack also points to the irony that it is precisely 
transcendental approach to reduction, which has been central for phenomenologists for many 
years, is what undermines the aim of phenomenology to ground itself in the field of the lived 
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experience and the world as it is experienced. In addition, for her, the Husserlian “transformation 
of subjectivity into an objective modality” confronts the other phenomenological concepts and, 
first of all, the concept of intentionality (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 38).  
While criticizing the transcendental perspective, Merleau-Ponty concludes that “The most 
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” 
(Phenomenology of Perception xv). It is fair to add that Husserl acknowledges these pitfalls of 
his conception of reduction and transcendental subjectivity. However, his desire to achieve 
certainty and clarity in description of experience through removal of any preconceptions and 
natural attitudes did not allow him to overcome the logocentric perspective of Cartesian idealistic 
philosophy. 
Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty considers phenomenology as the return to the world, which 
is impossible without reduction, that is, without elimination of the pre-given knowledge about 
this world. Nevertheless, if, for Husserl, the reduction comes to end when we focus on the pure 
consciousness and posit it as an absolute source of experience, then, for Merleau-Ponty, our body 
plays the role of such source, and reduction cannot be applied to this fundamental condition of 
our existence – the sensory and corporeal being within the world. 
It would be plausible to say that Husserl does not ignore the body as important 
determinant of human experience. As mentioned above, he treats senses as a condition for 
formation intentional connection between the subject and the world. According to him, the 
appearance of things in our experience is dependent on body and sensibility; body is “the bearer 
of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, out of which the pure Ego 
intuits space and the whole world of the senses” (Husserl, “Material Things” 12). While agreeing 
with constitutive role of the body in the formation of experience of pure consciousness, Husserl 
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notes that emphasis on the embodied subject in phenomenology would refer us to 
reestablishment of our natural attitude to the world. This attitude suppresses the stream of inner 
life and forces us to pay attention to the world as an object but not as a component of our 
experience, that is, to “the things experienced rather than the experience of things” (Cerbone 
108). For Husserl, by focusing on the body, we inevitably construct it as a thing experienced or 
material thing which is just a part of the reality subjected to physical objective laws. 
Merleau-Ponty shares Husserl’s thesis about the fundamental role of our body in the 
interaction with the world and organization of our experience. As he writes, “there is a logic of 
the world to which my body in its entirety conforms, and through which things of intersensory 
significance become possible for us” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 380). 
Meanwhile, he criticizes Husserl’s thesis about the unavoidable objectification of the body. In 
his view, this conclusion is an expression of those mechanic epistemologies dividing the body 
and mind against which phenomenology rebelled. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, the body is what possesses the quality of 
both object and subject. To conceptualize this idea, he introduces the metaphor of touch as a 
representation of the unity of the touched and the touching and impossibility to separate one 
from another in the very act of touch. Our body is what can be touched or objective thing that 
exists in the material world and at the same it is what touches or subject that does not belong to 
this world but aspires to explore it. The body can touch the things because “being of their family, 
itself visible and tangible, it uses its own being as a means to participate in theirs, because each 
of the two beings is an archetype for the other, because the body belongs to the order of the 
things as the world is universal flesh” (Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 137). Thus, 
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the body becomes an independent touch and vision because it is simultaneously the thing which 
is tangible and visible.  
It is important to note here that for Merleau-Ponty touch and vision are phenomena of the 
same nature. Every tactile being is doomed to visible existence. Meanwhile, vision itself is not 
independent from the material things but includes them. Our perception as well as touch 
constitutes the integrity and reversibility of the seeing and the seen, that is subjective and 
objective realities. This thesis has become crucial for phenomenological turn in film theory of 
the 1990s. This turn might also be called the “tactile turn,” since Merleau-Ponty’s analogy 
between the eye and touch has become a starting point for development of the theories of 
embodied, material spectatorship.  
Whereas classical and post-classical film theorists disregarded phenomenology or 
followed the principles of transcendental phenomenological study unsystematically and 
intuitively, film theory of the 1990s and 2000s has rediscovered phenomenological approach in 
its existential variant and consciously applied Merleau-Ponty’s perspective to studying the film 
experience. Although, as I said earlier, contemporary film phenomenology represents a hybrid, 
methodologically and thematically diverse movement, such concepts as intentionality, reduction, 
phenomenological description, and body are essential notions of this theoretical program.  
The distinctive contribution of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to film theory consists 
not only in the elaboration of alternative understanding of spectator as a subject whose 
corporeality becomes a significant factor of the film experience. Under the influence of 
existential phenomenology, film theory offers new philosophical anthropology as well as 
ontology of cinema. 
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The double reference of body to subjective and objective realms entails that a human 
being cannot be alienated from the world and the world cannot but participate in the construction 
of subjectivity of this being. “It teaches us,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “that each calls for the other” 
(The Visible and the Invisible 137). By emphasizing the role of spectatorial body and senses, 
phenomenological film theories reaffirm this connection between us and the world, between the 
subject and the other. They are interested in restoration of the contact among humans through 
articulation of our bodily experience as a unique structure that constitutes our existence and 
makes possible experience as such. Moreover, film phenomenology which believes in the 
mutability of subject and object establishes the new principles regarding ontology of film. Film 
is considered to be itself a body which is seen and can see, that is, it acquires features of subject 
and object. For example, in film phenomenology we deal with theories of film-body (Sobchack), 
film’s skin (Marks) or film as a three-dimensional tactile being (Barker). 
In the next chapter, I will address the fundamental epistemological assumptions of these 
phenomenological film theories and focus on such important questions as correlation of the 











Chapter 4. Film Phenomenology as Dialectic of the Seeing and the Seen   
The fundamental task underlying the phenomenological turn in contemporary film theory 
consists in understanding the film experience as a complex, existential state irreducible to the 
logic of correlation between the consciousness and the unconscious, process of meaning-making 
or physiological reactions to stimuli. Film phenomenology prioritizes the embodied nature of 
vision and the corporeal spectator whose body contributes to the film experience. For film 
phenomenology, the body is not merely a physical organism and set of senses subject to 
objective biological law but a vehicle of existence and condition of interaction with the world, 
and in particular with the cinematic world. The spectator’s body is regarded as a guarantee of the 
possibility of film experience and as an essential factor of the film viewing. 
In addition, although film phenomenology is less concerned with the cinematic qualities 
and devices as such, it also offers an alternative approach to ontology of cinema, based on the 
recognition of materiality of film. While considering the film experience through the prism of 
intentionality, phenomenology does not distinguish film from the spectator but focuses on a 
continuum between them. The mutability of the viewer and the screen in the stream of the lived 
experience implies that film acquires features of the subject and, moreover, becomes an 
embodied thing in its expression whereas the viewer acquires the status of object whose 
materiality is visible, changeable, and controlled. Thus, film phenomenology emphasizes the 
corporeality of the film image, technology, and cinematic narrative along with the corporeality of 
the spectator. 
The emphasis on the diffusion of spectatorial and cinematic beings is a central leitmotif 
of the major phenomenological theories of film. These theories approach the integrity of the 
viewer and cinema as a complex dialectic of the embodied seeing and the embodied seen. In this 
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chapter, I will examine the main philosophical assumptions that are at the basis of this concept of 
the dialectic film experience. First, I will turn to the thesis of reversibility of perception and 
expression, that is of subject and object, and explain how an embodied and enworlded nature of 
the sight determines it. Second, I will focus on the essential arguments which allow film 
phenomenologists to position the viewer as a mode of expression or object whose corporeality is 
visible and tangible. Third, I will analyze the phenomenological claim about the capacity of film 
to act as a perceiver and to reveal its subjectivity. Finally, I will discuss how the concept of the 
dialectic of the seeing and the seen creates the possibility for semiotic phenomenology, where 
the boundary between the sign and the matter or culture and body is erased, and the film 
experience as an experience of the materiality of signification is investigated.  
 
1. Film Experience as a Subject-Object Diffusion  
The issue of the film experience as understood in the logic of correlation between 
embodied vision and embodied visibility became clearly articulated for the first time in 
Sobchack’s film theory and was developed by Marks, Barker, Stadler, Wahlberg and other 
phenomenologically inclined scholars on the basis of Sobchack’s account.  
By applying the principle of intentionality, Sobchack turns away from considering the 
film as an object or a single unity and focuses on the act of viewing in which the visible world 
and the viewer are interconnected in the lived experience. For her, the intentionality of the film 
experience does not simply represent a fixed correlational framework that allows the viewer to 
cognitively react to a movie. As she puts it, the film experience represents a set of “dynamically 
and directionally reversible acts that reflexively and reflectively constitute the perception of 
expression and the expression of perception” (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 5). 
55	
	
It follows from this formulation that the reversibility of perception and expression lies at 
the core of our intentional relationship to film. The spectator participates not only in the act of 
seeing but also in the act of being seen. Film, in turn, also becomes a site of this simultaneous 
balancing between two modes of intentionality and functions as both perceptive and expressive 
thing. “Seeing,” Sobchack writes, “presents itself as the seen, it points to the seen, and it 
represents the seen to and for an other who sees” (The Address of the Eye 132). 
Influenced by Sobchack and Merleau-Ponty, Marks uses the concept of touch to describe 
this perception-expression continuum of the film experience. Just as the boundary between the 
touching subject and the touched object seems to be erased in the tactile contact, the boundary 
between the viewer and film also becomes flexible and unstable in the act of watching since 
experiential distinguishing subjective vision from its object is unrealizable. According to Marks’ 
interpretation, the impossibility of separating the vision from its content ontologically embodies 
the integrity of subject and object in the tactile experience of the encounter of two surfaces. In 
this haptic revelation of film viewing, as Marks writes, “our self rushes up to the surface to 
interact with another surface. When this happens there is a concomitant loss of depth – we 
become amoebalike, lacking a center, changing as the surface to which we cling changes” 
(Touch xvi). Like the seeing and the seen, on the one hand, and the touching and the touched, on 
the other, the spectator and film absorb each other: unable to differentiate my perception from 
what this perception is about, I exist as part of the film, whereas the film is incorporated as part 
of myself. Thus, what Marks implies is that, in this mode of coexistence, the viewer’s identity as 
well as the film’s identity become hardly recognizable. The relationship between them is a 
process of continual mutual transformation. 
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This relationship – or, as Chamarette puts it, the “chiasmic in-betweenness of film 
encounters” – constitutes the object of film phenomenology (Phenomenology and the Future of 
Film, 3). Neither spectator nor film are of interest to phenomenologist. Phenomenology is 
concerned with their active mutability that is represented through the dynamics of the 
seeing/touching and the seen/touched.  
Following Merleau-Ponty, film phenomenologists acknowledge that the exchange 
between the seeing and the seen, that is, between the spectator and film occurs because 
perception is not a transcendental, alienated activity but an embodied and enworlded 
phenomenon. The eye is never free from the rest of the body. It is a part of our carnal sensorium 
where all senses and feelings are interconnected. The smell of a rose may evoke its visual image 
or taste of rose petal jam or painful feeling of touching the flower’s sharp thorns and, on the 
contrary, the appearance of this rose in front of our eyes can make us recall all these senses of 
smell, taste, and touch. This is to say that perception is synesthetic and functions in relation to 
other senses. It is also connected to our material situatedness within the world and subject to the 
physical presence and properties of our bodily existence as well as those of others. The 
perception is structured by the matter which underlies it. Meanwhile, it is structured by the 
matter that exists as its object because our body and the outer world physically belong to the 
same ontological order. 
While referring to the synesthetic and enworlded nature of vision, Barker suggests we 
approach the film experience as a three-dimensional action where we perceive the film 
“haptically, at the tender surface of the body; kinaesthetically and muscularly, in the middle 
dimension of muscles, tendons, and bones that reach toward and through cinematic space; and 
viscerally, in the murky recesses of the body, where heart, lungs, pulsing fluids, and firing 
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synapses receive, respond to, and reenact the rhythms of cinema” (3). Equally, in 
phenomenology, the film’s perception never functions outside of the cinematic body that 
manifests itself through the film technology and matter of the world filmed. For Barker, we also 
can distinguish haptical, kinaesthetic, and visceral regimes of the cinematic corporeality enacted 
through the screen surface, the boundaries of off-screen and on-screen space, and projector and 
lenses correspondingly (3). 
 
2. The Viewer as a Material Object 
Our sensuous connection with the world and the materiality of our seeing body involves 
the fact that we exist not only as a seeing subject but also as a seen object. The status of object is 
acquired through various mechanisms.  
As a viewer, I achieve the status of the seen because, while focusing on the screen, I 
invest my own material being into the film. Watching Eyes Without a Face (Georges Franju, 
1960), I shudder at the view of scalpel cutting a face of young woman. The rhythm and dynamics 
of Run Lola Run (Tom Tykwer, 1998) make me viscerally feel the speed and velocity of 
movement. Aleksey German’s smoky rooms in Khrustalyov, My Car! (1998) evoke the smell of 
tea, tobacco and the newly washed linens. And the flavor of flowers, raw fish and mustard 
fiercely eaten by characters of Perfect Sense (David Mackenzie, 2011) also becomes tangible to 
me. Due to this investment of my own body and senses which are always a factor of my vision, 
“I will reflexively turn toward my own carnal, sensual, and sensible being to touch myself 
touching, smell myself smelling, taste myself tasting, and, in sum, sense my own sensuality” 
(Sobchack, “What My Fingers Knew” 77). Thus, I become a visible/sensible object to myself in 
the act of seeing. In his The Book of Skin, Connor, in turn, explains that the objectifying of the 
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seeing subject results from dependence of vision on distance and capacity to isolate me from 
myself, to dissociate the visible part of me from the rest. As he notes, “this very dissociation is 
what allows me to dissociate myself in turn from this dissociation of myself, allows recourse to 
what one can call recursive reparation: as the involvement of the eye in masochistic fantasy 
suggests, you can always watch yourself being watched” (Connor 68).  
The existential reversibility of the spectator’s vision through its embodied nature and 
distance is also conjoined with a real film viewing environment. I am not merely a perceiving 
subject but the visible body because I am part of the tangible world and others can recognize my 
material presence. The physical existence of the viewer is recognized by other viewers, 
filmmakers, creators of cinematic technologies, and institutions. In watching a film, my body is 
positioned in a specific way in accordance with social conventions and material circumstances of 
the environment, be it a movie theater, classroom or my own house. 
Depending on the physical and cultural space, there are various modes of the viewer’s 
visibility. For instance, the architecture and interior organization, size of the screen, and presence 
of other people in movie theaters prescribe my bodily behavior and structure my sensitivity. The 
very institution of movie theater has been created with the viewer’s body in mind – the body 
which keeps silence, remains relatively immobile and plunged into a darkness. Meanwhile, 
another type of the spectatorial body has been made visible via portable devices such as tablets 
or cellphones. This body is unstable and can be hardly situated; it gains a control over the screen 
and openly declares itself. As such, this mode of embodied spectatorship becomes an illustration 
of phenomenological mutability of the seeing and the seen. In this regard, Casetti writes,  
spectators now model films, or remodel them onto themselves, thanks to a combination 
of precise practices that affect the object, the modalities, and the conditions of vision. The 
effect is that the spectators become the active protagonists of the game, even if they 
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continue to be it pawns. They are no longer asked to be present at a projection with eyes 
wide open, just reacting to the film or to the environment; instead, they must act to make 
their own viewing possible. Attendance has ceded the field to performance. (186) 
Thus, the viewer’s body turns into performative thing emphasizing its own existence and 
visibility in the film experience. 
 
3. Film as a Material Subject 
While, in order to formulate the theory of cinematic experience, Sobchack’s film 
phenomenology and its followers require the special clarification of how the viewer can be the 
seen, it also demands an answer to the question of how film can be a viewing subject. In this 
regard, Frampton identifies four main theses of Sobchack’s analysis: “film sees and expresses its 
seeing;” “it is subjective;” “it is embodied;” and “the filmgoer feels this presence, this other” 
(41). It seems that, again, the assumption of embodiment and materiality plays an essential role 
in this analysis. 
For Sobchack, film is capable of expressing the act of viewing and of being subjective 
exactly because it has a body. By mirroring and absorbing the sensuous spectatorial gaze, the 
film acquires its corporeality through the connection with the viewer’s corporeality. Structurally, 
these two orders of the carnal – the cinematic carnal and the spectatorial carnal – coincide and 
supplement each other. As Sobchack puts it, “Both the film’s body and the spectator’s body are 
implicated in their respective perceptive activity, enable it, and allow it expression in the world. 
Both the film’s body and the spectator’s body intend their perception coterminously, and both 
also express their perception as lived introceptively” (The Address of the Eye 217). Marks, in 
turn, continues to develop this assumption while referring to the fundamentally mimetic nature of 
the film/spectator relationship. For her, mimesis as a basic condition of the film experience, 
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creates a situation where “erstwhile subjects take on the physical, material qualities of objects, 
while objects take on the perceptive and knowledgeable qualities of subjects” (Marks, The Skin 
of the Film 141). In our immediate experience, we see film as mimicking us, that is, mimicking 
our subjectivity. While coexisting with it and imposing our senses on the film, we perceive it as a 
subject. 
Meanwhile, the cinematic embodied vision and subjectivity are irreducible to the 
spectator’s investment. First, the film articulates its materiality and capacity to see as a subject 
by means of technology. At the most basic level, the film’s body manifests itself through camera, 
projector, and screen. Just like the human body becomes a fundamental modality and point of 
orientation for perception, these technological bodies serve as points of orientation for cinematic 
vision. The material technology is one of the conditions of the cinematic subjectivity because it 
is what actively reorganizes and restructures the world in accordance with its purposes and 
possibilities. Such cinematic techniques and devices as editing, framing, coloring, and so on, also 
point to the physical nature of cinema and at the same time to its subjective power to subdue and 
transform the reality. The technological body becomes a universal mediator for the spectator. 
While describing the multiplicity of our relations with the cinematic technology, Stadler writes 
that “We see the technology (the screen), we see with the technology (the camera and the 
spectator both look at the story world together), and we see through the technology (we are 
largely unaware of the presence of the projector, or of the camera . . .). We also see in addition to 
the technology (we can look away from the screen, or look at one small part of it)” (46).  
The technology and cinematic techniques function as a demonstration of reflexive, 
subjective activity of film or ability of the film’s body “to expressively organize the perceptual 
experience of consciousness” (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 252). That is, according to 
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Sobchack, film might be understood as showing the work of mind or even representing an 
independent, effective mind that possesses a unique view of the reality. 
One should note that the concept of cinematic mind is not new in film theory. 
Furthermore, the film-mind analogy constitutes one of the major philosophical paradigms taken 
by film theorists. However, the contribution of film phenomenology to these debates consists in 
its implicit acknowledgement of the interdependence of matter and consciousness. For film 
phenomenologists, consciousness which is never empty and directed toward the world cannot be 
separated from materiality of this world, on the one hand, and body, on the other. Equally, they 
consider the film mind as materially embedded and corporeally grounded expression of the work 
of consciousness. Many leading film theorists, on the contrary, tend to eliminate the issue of 
matter in their discussion of film as mind. For instance, Münsterberg strictly distinguished 
consciousness and reality by stating that film “obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the 
outer world” (97). Metz, whose famous comparison of cinema with dreaming and hallucination 
deeply informs the psychoanalytic film theory, emphasizes that film in its recreation of the 
unconscious is based on “temporary suspension of concern for the exterior world as well as the 
cathexis of objects, at least in their real form” (207). Another example is Gilles Deleuze’s 
approach. Although, under the influence of Bergsonian views on the correlation between mind 
and matter, Deleuze seems to provide the phenomenological perspective and equate the 
consciousness and the reality, he prioritizes the mechanisms of mind in this equation. That is, 
while phenomenology insists on the idea that matter is a modality of conscious life and its 
essential condition, Deleuze focuses on how consciousness informs the matter and, in fact, 
subjects the reality to its own laws. Revealing itself due to its connection with the spectator’s and 
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filmmaker’s consciousness, the cinematic mind, for Deleuze, does not give us the body and 
matter because  
it sets itself a different objective; it spreads an “experimental night” or a white space over 
us; it works with “dancing seeds” and a “luminous dust”; it affects the visible with a 
fundamental disturbance, and the world with a suspension, which contradicts all natural 
perception. What it produces in this way is the genesis of an “unknown body” which we 
have in the back of our heads, like the unthought in thought . . . (194) 
Thus, despite the fact that the philosopher points to the production of corporeality through the 
cinematic work, this corporeality appears to come from the depths of mind. The “unknown 
body” of cinema is a potentiality of consciousness but not of the matter.  
It may seem that, while theorizing about the cinematic embodied subjectivity, film 
phenomenology can consider the cinematic technology and devices from the formalist 
perspective. But, unlike formalism, phenomenological approach often accentuates the matter of 
film by suppressing the self-evident, aesthetic correspondence between technology, on the one 
hand, and symbolic and narrative form of cinematic text, on the other. In this regard, 
phenomenology, as Chare and Watkins put it, focuses on the “viewer’s encounter with the 
substance that undergirds the image” (75). In their analysis of found footage films Lyrical 
Nitrate (Peter Delpeut, 1990) and Decasia (Bill Morrison, 2002), Chare and Watkins examine 
the ability of the cinematic flesh to manifest itself through the substance of decaying, fading and 
damaged footage. They demonstrate that this footage “functions to undermine the grammar and 
syntax of the films, their symbolic aspect, disrupting cinema’s narrative function and . . . 
permitting the thing that is film to materialize alternative, often disavowed, meanings” (Chare 
and Watkins 75-76). The key point to take from this is that the carnality of film confirms the 
cinematic subjectivity not only because it determines the film’s active involvement in 
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reorganization of the world but also because it is able to conflict with proposed meanings, 
challenge and replace them. Thus, by focusing on the material form of cinema, phenomenology 
considers film as what acts and not only as what is acted upon.  
The phenomenological assumption that cinema is an embodied subjectivity is closely 
associated with the view that film does not merely see the world but also reveals its seeing. 
Phenomenology addresses film as “experience expressing experience,” that is, as intentional 
activity of seeing as such (Sobchack, The Address of the Eye 5). For phenomenology, film 
possesses subjectivity because it literally represents how the mutual connection between the 
perception and the world is realized. The intentionality as a property of subjective 
consciousness/experience is also a property of film, since the film’s object (the reality to which it 
relates) is the film itself. And this cinematic intentionality, intentionality of other consciousness, 
is visible and tangible for the viewer.  
Meanwhile, by accepting the phenomenological stance, one can say again that the matter 
becomes crucial for this process. In this case, however, we emphasize not the film’s 
technological body but materiality of the world which serves as an object for the cinematic 
vision. In its capacity to refer to the real stream of experience, film indicates the union of the 
corporeality of the world and perception. The matter of the objective world enters the cinematic 
eye and communicates its physical properties to the image. This assumption has particular 
resonance in relation with the issue of trace in film theory as it was presented by Walter 
Benjamin, André Bazin, Stanley Cavell, Roland Barthes and others. In this context,  
Wahlberg offers her phenomenology of cinematic trace where she emphasizes that the trace of 
the world reveals itself in the image not only through materiality of the vestige but also through 
recreation of the sense of pastness, sensuous manifestation of presence of the absent. It is 
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important that, according to Wahlberg, this recreation of the world has specific sensuous, 
physical nature because it often “fuses with violence and death” (60). Although this idea 
correlates with Bazin’s concept of a mummy complex, Wahlberg directly refers to the specificity 
of affective impact of the cinematic image on the viewer’s experience but not to the cultural 
origins of the cinematic representation. For her, cinema delivers the sense of decay and 
deterioration of the material world. Unlike Bazin and other theorists of the trace, she also 
underscores that the visual representation is not constitutive for the cinematic trace. As she notes, 
sound plays significant role in the cinematic materialization of the reality.  
To sum up, from the perspective of phenomenology, the subjectivity of cinema is based 
on a three-level dynamics of the matter. Film becomes the subject due to (1) the viewer’s bodily 
and sensuous investment; (2) activity of the cinematic flesh revealing itself through technology 
and devices; and (3) indexical correlation with the pro-filmic world whose materiality becomes 
an inseparable content of the cinematic vision. The connection with the spectator’s body allows 
film to mimic and “borrow” the subjectivity of the viewer. The technological body conditions the 
capacity of film to reflexively reestablish and reconsider the world, while constructing 
independent meaning. And finally, the matter of the world which saturates the cinematic 
perception demonstrates that film duplicates the fundamental feature of subjective 
consciousness, namely, the feature to be of something, or to be intentional. 
Although phenomenology opens new perspectives for ontological studies of cinema, one 
should recall that film phenomenology itself is not concerned with cinema in the ontological 
sense. It focuses on the exchange between the spectator and film in the lived experience of 
viewing. In this regard, phenomenology attributes importance to the film subjectivity and 
acknowledges its possibility as such only with regard to the viewer. In its modalities of the 
65	
	
seeing and the seen, film exists only to us and only in the spectatorial event. At the same time, 
whereas it reveals itself within our experience, film is not exactly our experience. This capacity 
of film to be a subject and physically demonstrate the subjectivity is always considered as a 
condition for meeting of the spectator with the specific Other. This Other is not merely a 
distanced object that becomes close and visible to us. As Sobchack writes, film “presents and 
represents an other who is with us and for us and in itself as an ‘object-subject’” (The Address of 
the Eye 142). In the film experience, we meet the Other who coexists with us and who appears 
not only as an object of our experience but as a subject whose internal life has a material form 
and is tangible to us. This is the Other whose subjectivity is not taken for granted but exists as 
the matter. 
The film experience, thus, activates a particular regime of interaction with the Other. This 
interaction is based not on the complete merging of our and the cinematic existence but on the 
feeling of our material similarity and equal co-presence in the world. In this regard Sobchack 
writes 
Certainly, a form of absorption can and does occur in the film experience. But it is not a 
concrete absorption into the body of the other or the consciousness of the other. Rather, it 
is a mutual absorption in the world, a mutually directed interest that converges in the 
visible and its significance. This similar intentional directedness and interest is lived as a 
similar (but nonidentical) bodily style of being in the world. Thus, at moments, the 
spectator and the film may live their vision in concert, may seem to predicate it 
“identically,” each absorbed by and in the other’s predication. (The Address of the Eye, 
273) 
What is startling about this formulation is that Sobchack emphasizes the role of “bodily style of 
being in the world” which is shared by the viewer and the film. And again, the similarity of the 
viewer’s being and the film’s being comes from the intentionality of their activity. The film 
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demonstrates that it is inseparable from the world it is about. At the same time, the viewer’s 
experience is not isolated from what this experience is about. Both the spectator and the film are 
subject-objects and exist in the material integrity with the reality.  
The process of mutual implication of the Self and the Other in the film viewing where the 
viewer and film find ourselves adopting a position between these extremes, or rather, playing the 
role of both subject and object, has its roots in the persistence of the matter. Phenomenological 
film theory demonstrates that the film experience is embodied and carnal. But this is a specific 
mode of carnality which can be approached in various ways. Film phenomenology can switch 
between the focus on embodied vision of the viewer and film, on the one hand, and on their 
embodied visibility, on the other. Phenomenological approach, however, never focuses on the 
stable material essences and foregrounds the bodily reversibility of the spectator and film. This is 
a crucial demand of phenomenological study of the film experience. 
 
4. Semiotic Phenomenology 
Whereas film phenomenology considers the spectatorship as grounded in the corporeality 
and matter, it also admits the flexibility and changeability of the material conditions of the film 
experience. The materiality of film and spectator manifests itself differently and depends on the 
specific situation. The spectatorial body is never “clear.” It is situated within personal, gender, 
race, social, and cultural histories which are not merely abstract contexts. Although these 
contexts are paradigms of signification, they have material equivalent found in the bodies, 
organization of space, production of objects, and physical interaction with them. The cinematic 
body, in turn, is subjected to codes of technology, institutions, and aesthetics. And once again, 
these codes are not ideal but can be embodied. Aesthetics is especially important here because it 
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is articulated explicitly in the cinematic physical self-revelation. Aesthetic mode directly 
characterizes the forms of the corporeality of film. For instance, the genre aesthetics of horror 
films often implies the direct address to human flesh and evokes trauma of bodily disintegration. 
Meanwhile, the aesthetics of wildlife films establishes connection between human and non-
human materiality while challenging the conventional patterns of identification and mimetic 
relationship. 
Taking into account the influence of the sign reality and cultural codes on the film 
experience, Sobchack introduces the concept of “semiotic phenomenology” of film. At first 
glance, there may appear a tension between the phenomenological directive to describe the film 
experience in its immediacy and fluidity and claiming that the analysis of cultural and symbolic 
contexts is important for this study. In this regard Wahlberg notes that the very expression 
“semiotic phenomenology” is a “provoking oxymoron” (xi). As she clarifies, philosophical 
phenomenology “opts for a transcendental method to reveal sensory data through a precise 
system of description,” and semiotics “draws upon the intersubjective realm of language and a 
systematic analysis of structural patterns that are primordial to specific meanings’ (Wahlberg xi-
xii). Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, phenomenological approach tends to suppress 
analytical explanation of the experience. While prioritizing the articulation of experience as it is 
through description, phenomenology considers analysis as a superimposition of pre-knowledge 
and tyranny against the lived experience.  
However, under the influence of Paul Ricoeur, Sobchack reconsiders this perspective by 
starting with the revision of differentiation between the literal and metaphorical meanings. 
Phenomenology implies that description provides the most accurate view to the experience 
because it is based on the literal transfer of the real in language. Meanwhile, analysis and 
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explanation use highly metaphorical linguistic constructions determined by epistemological, 
historical and social conventions and, moreover, are often directed to the production of new 
metaphorical systems which do not shed light on the reality but continue to alienate it from us. 
While referring to the film experience, Sobchack, in turn, argues that “In that experience the 
literal and figural reciprocate and reverse themselves as “sense” – primary and secondary 
contexts confused, hierarchy and thus the grounds of metaphor undermined if not completely 
undone” (“What My Fingers Knew” 80).  
In the film experience, the boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is erased. 
The sign of the film image is experienced as a material reality that exists in front of our eyes. It is 
interesting to note that quite often phenomenological descriptions of the film experience seem to 
be metaphorical. The attempt to convey the sensations (smell, taste, touch, etc.) or to describe the 
cinematic flesh as it is given through film stock, color, close-ups and so on produces an effect of 
almost poetic expression. Meanwhile, here we deal with the deconstruction of the metaphoric. 
Sobchack explains that a word acquires its literal meaning only within the normative contexts, 
whereas it becomes metaphoric when it is used in an unconventional way. At the same time, if 
we accept the phenomenological assumption that our experience represents the unity of all 
senses, diffusion of the material and the immaterial, and of the objective and the subjective, then 
we also accept the impossibility to recognize any hierarchy, including hierarchy of meanings and 
hierarchy of the normative and non-normative contexts of using those meanings. Therefore, we 
lose the ability to recognize the literal and the metaphoric. Sobchack concludes that in our 
perception of the sensual language of phenomenological description as metaphoric we are under 
the influence of reductive “afterthought” (“What My Fingers Knew” 80).   
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Just like the metaphoric turns out to be the literality and corporeality in the act of talking 
about the film viewing, the cultural signs and codes become existential and material modality of 
the film experience. They are not extraneous, received schemata but inseparable part of our 
interaction with the film. In this regard, Sobchack writes that 
the film experience – on both sides of the screen – mobilizes, confuses, reflectively 
differentiates, yet experientially unites lived bodies and language, and foregrounds the 
reciprocity and reversibility of sensible matter and sensual meaning. Our fingers, our skin 
and nose and lips and tongue and stomach and all other parts of us understand what we 
see in the film experience. (“What My Fingers Knew” 84).   
That is, there is no recognizable, identifiable difference between the non-cultural and the cultural 
in the film experience. MacDougall emphasizes this co-presence by saying that “We see 
conceptually, metaphorically, linguistically. But whatever our culture, we also see to some extent 
literally” (2).  
Semiotic phenomenology is possible because it ignores hierarchies of the primary and 
secondary levels of meaning-making. The signification and materiality coexist in their 
mutability. One of the tasks of phenomenological approach, then, becomes the task of exposing 
of how the carnal manifests itself in the signification and how the signification articulates its 
materiality. For this reason, focus on the body of spectator and film body as the symbolical, 
culturally conditioned matters is not something extraneous and paradoxical towards film 
phenomenology. On the contrary, this is what helps to describe experience understood through 
the prism of correlation with the world, where the latter exists as the unity of the material and the 
sign. 
This perspective implying the synchronicity of matter and sign or experience and 
construction of meaning is promoted by other film phenomenologists. The scholars aim to show 
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that the “muteness” of bodies and the matter never entails the absence of meaning or our futility 
to understand it experientially. While referring to the specific examples from cinema, they show 
that the matter of medium always exists in the context of its form that is sign. Equally, the matter 
of the viewer is grounded within the act of sign-making. 
Cobb underscores this phenomenological assumption by stating that meaning “emerges 
for us as a direct result of our fundamental state of being-in-the-world” and that it is “our always 
embodied and irreducibly involved relationship with the world” (“Cinema of Pre-predication”). 
That is, our existential, material presence itself becomes a condition for meaning. For Cobb, Stan 
Brakhage’s filmmaking aesthetic, especially prominent in The Act of Seeing With One’s Own 
Eyes (1971), is what perfectly demonstrates that the meaning exists within a thing because it is a 
thing and because the corporeal cannot be outside of our consciousness, and vice versa. As he 
continues, “when we thematise phenomena, we cannot and should not attempt to detach 
ourselves completely from it; we cannot perceive objects from nowhere, but only from within the 
world itself” (“Cinema of Pre-predication”).  
In her analysis of Jean-Luc Godard’s Passion (1982), following from Merleau-Ponty and 
Sobchack, Del Rio emphasizes that the distinction between the body and its meaning is barely 
perceptible. For her, the bodily gesture is what proves the impossibility of such kind of division, 
and Godard’s reconstruction of Rembrandt’s Nightwatch along with images of Isabelle Huppert 
illustrate this “capacity of the body to speak for its subject” through the action and pose (Del Rio, 
“Alchemies of Thought” 66). The gesture, according to Del Rio, reveals both meaning and 
intentionality of consciousness and shows that “the body functions as a primordial ground of 
semiosis” (“Alchemies of Thought” 66). This is true not only for the cinematic image itself but 
also for the body of spectator whose voyeuristic and constrained position still “exhibits its own 
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particular bodily conduct and signification” (Del Rio, “The Body of Voyeurism” 145). The 
absence or presence of the spectator’s gesture and its specificity, thus, mark a specific mode of 
symbolic involvement. 
By formulating her research task as “to find culture within the body” (The Skin of the 
Film, 152), Marks actively supports the main assumptions of Sobchack’s semiotic 
phenomenology and clearly declares her disagreement with the position that the body and senses 
oppose the meaning and knowledge. For her, the separation of experience and logic of sign is a 
result of “the Eurocentric mistake of thinking” (The Skin of the Film, 144). The historically well-
entrenched disregard or suppression of proximal senses in Western culture results in the belief 
that these senses and corporeality do not belong to culture in general, whereas many non-
Western cultural regimes explicitly situate body within production of meaning and their 
epistemologies. According to Marks, our body and sensorium are culturally informed and 
symbolically saturated and, in the film experience, “We bring our own personal and cultural 
organization of the senses to cinema, and cinema brings a particular organization of the senses to 
us . . .” (The Skin of the Film, 152). 
The concept of semiotic phenomenology which comes from the elaboration of the 
dialectic of the embodied seeing and the embodied seen demonstrates that film phenomenology 
has roots in radical materialism. The phenomenological understanding of sign, language and 
culture through the prism of their physical manifestation, on the one hand, and positioning of the 
matter within the context of act of signification, on the other, challenge the familiar inclination of 
film scholars to distinguish aesthetic and cultural film studies. The phenomenological 
perspective as it is presented in contemporary film theory suggests the reconsideration of 
conventional oppositions of the matter and culture, biology and psychology.  
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In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that, despite the diversity of phenomenological 
approaches to cinema, the intention to reexamine the normative epistemological division of 
subject and object, sight and the seen, and body and culture is what characterizes the agenda of 
entire phenomenological movement in film studies. While focusing on the embodied nature of 
our vision as well as on the embodied existence of its content, film phenomenologists offer the 
fresh framework for analysis of film experience and cinema as artistic, technological and cultural 
phenomenon. Within this framework, the spectator and film unroll as the mutually corresponding 
and dependent matters possessing corporeality. The bodily being of the viewer and film underlies 
the instability of their status as subject or object and implies that they always exist in the 
situation of changing places. This ontological merging of subjectivity and objectivity constitutes 
the essential assumption of all film phenomenological theories today. It also determines the 
development of contemporary media phenomenology inspired by actual transformation of 













Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The studies of spectatorship remain one of the most problematic areas in film theory. The 
exploration of the nature of film viewing is the subject of sustained controversy having to do 
with an ambivalent position of scholar, and unification and idealization of the film experiences.  
The criterion of objectivity of academic research demands the scholar’s self-exclusion, 
suppression of his/her subjectivity. In film studies, this requirement often leads to the separation 
of scholarly perspective from the perspective of spectator. The status of scholar as a concerned, 
curious film viewer is often concealed or abolished. Meanwhile, it is impossible to conduct the 
study of film experience by keeping the personal distance from the object. Moreover, the very 
idea of this field contradicts the tasks of “objectivity” set by classical academia. As a result, the 
theorists dealing with the issue of film viewing are forced to balance between the institutional 
conventions and epistemological agenda conditioned by the specificity of their area of studies. 
The crucial problem here is that the pressure of rationalist models of investigation outweigh and 
the scholar’s presence paradoxically turns out to be invisible in the situation where its visibility 
is necessary. 
The recreation of film experience in its complexity and multiplicity is beset with similar 
difficulties. The prerequisites of rigorous, objective theoretical research seem to reduce the film 
viewing to a set of static characteristics shared by every spectator. The spectatorship is often 
explained through the ready-made formulas, whether they are psychoanalytic models or 
cognitive assumptions. These formulas create the ideal viewer whose position is defined by 
theoretical pre-conceptions of particular paradigms, whereas the real existential, cultural and 
historical instability and diversity of film experiences are silenced. 
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The phenomenological turn of the 1990s and 2000s in film studies is a reaction to these 
persistent problems of theory of film experience. Contemporary film phenomenology is an 
attempt to restore the scholar’s subjectivity and to subvert the accepted views to research 
behavior. In this regard, I wanted to bring attention to phenomenological turn as an 
epistemological revolution which redefines the strategies of film scholarship and academic study 
in general. Thus, film phenomenology is not a complete theory of spectatorship which offers us 
causal explanations of how we experience film. It is a specific methodology and model of 
philosophical thinking which gives us an opportunity to reevaluate our approaches to theorizing 
and talking about film viewing. 
My ultimate goal was to explain where the phenomenological epistemology comes from 
and which fundamental assumptions underlie this project in film theory. The reason why I 
consider the research of these issues to be important is that, despite the growing popularity of 
phenomenological studies of film which have already acquired a status of academic fashion, 
many film scholars tend to apply phenomenological approach randomly and incoherently. 
Without understanding the ethical meaning of film phenomenology and its connection with a 
distinct intellectual tradition, we cannot fully uncover the potential of this paradigm for our 
future studies (Casetti, 2015; Gunning, 2008).  
I started my research by analyzing the epistemic standards of classical and post-classical 
film theory which film phenomenology opposes. One of such basic standards questioned by film 
phenomenology is ocularcentrism, that is, the assumption that we experience film exclusively 
through the vision and that the looking determines our spectatorial position. Film 
phenomenologists do not deny the obvious fact that the sight plays an important role in our 
experience of film. Rather, they criticize the ideas of the fundamental distance and hierarchy 
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which produced by ocularcentrism. Ocularcentric paradigm implies that our vision is separated 
from the rest of our body and from the world but connected with our mind which perceives the 
film through the eyes. This perspective prioritizes the distances between the vision and the body 
and between the consciousness and the body and isolates us from the outer world by situating us 
as external observers. It creates a sensuous hierarchy where vision becomes the most significant 
sense and hierarchy of the mind-body relationship where the body takes a subordinate position. 
The ocularcentrism is directly associated with another epistemic standard rooted in 
Cartesian rationalism and criticized by film phenomenology. This type of rationalism is what 
informs the entire tradition of Western humanities, including film theory. While promoting the 
dichotomy of mind and body, Cartesianism is skeptical about the category of experience as such. 
It insists that knowledge is received and produced by the reason which is immaterial essence. 
The corporeality of our existence and materiality of the world are obstacles for our cognition. In 
this regard, the division between the subject and the object is not only ontological separation 
between us and the physical world but also epistemological separation between the cognizing 
subject and the cognized object. This subject-object antithesis, foregrounding of the mind, and 
oppression of the corporeal existence are dominant lines of thought which have been adopted by 
most of film theories. 
Cartesian anxiety in response to the matter has engendered another epistemic tendency, 
namely, tendency to turn the material into the immaterial through signification. The conversion 
of the lived, embodied experience of film into the operation with signs and abstract concepts is 
what conditions the dominance of linguistic and semiotic models of analysis in film theory. 
These theories do not merely apply such models in articulating and explaining the film 
experience but they transfer them on the very nature of this experience. That is, these models 
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serve not as epistemological strategies but as ready, complete ontologies of the film experience. 
The film viewing here becomes an expression or illustration of the pregiven concepts.  
What has happened due to the phenomenological turn in film theory is that these 
epistemological strategies and premises were recognized as insufficient for understanding our 
interaction with film. Film phenomenology calls upon us to think about our film experience 
through the entire body, through our real, material presence in front of the screen. It 
acknowledges the bodily nature of vision and the inseparability of mind and our carnality. 
Moreover, it acknowledges the integrity of the spectator and the surrounding environment which 
also includes film. Thus, the subject-object dichotomy loses its authority. The reversibility of 
subject and object entails that their division cannot be a criterion of the research objectivity. Film 
phenomenology brackets all questions about objectivity as such because it is driven by intention 
to express the film experience as it is while disregarding explanatory mode of study. The 
viewer’s embodied, palpable subjectivity living in the unity with the world is the main source for 
phenomenological investigation. 
In my research, I adopt the view that the emergence of new epistemologies is directly 
related to the cultural transformations. Therefore, the legitimization of phenomenological project 
in film theory is not accidental process but culturally and politically conditioned phenomenon. At 
the most basic level, the advent of film phenomenology has to do with the reorganization of our 
experience due to new media technologies. The sensuous shock caused by the new conditions of 
bodily involvement in the process of consumption, production and distribution of media has 
made us rediscover our body and reconsider the connection between the consciousness and 
corporeality of our existence. The contemporary media environment makes the body visible and 
active. In addition, today interactive media systems erase the boundary between us as subjects 
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and media products as objects of our experience. We, in fact, participate in film and film 
participates in our life due to digital technologies, numerous devices, and networking. It is 
notable that this deconstruction of the subject-object boundary is realized through the 
disintegration of our body. The body has become so tangible because its stability has been 
shaken. 
Film phenomenology is an epistemological response to the reconfiguration of our bodily 
existence through the recent media practices. It is also a reaction to the new identity politics 
based on the recognition of flexible and uncertain identities. The transformation of economic 
systems under conditions of circulation of the global capital and erosion of national and cultural 
barriers suggests the model of decentralized and undetermined subject whose ability to produce 
and consume is not restricted. The formation of such subject is achieved through the 
deconstruction of the previous rationalist models of knowledge. In this regard, the 
phenomenological turn in film theory reproduces this paradigm by reinforcing the fundamental 
logic of the late capitalism. Film phenomenology mirrors the new ethics where the subject is 
uncontrolled and where the dominance of one specific mode of knowledge is considered to be 
impossible and undesirable. For this reason, film phenomenology is closely associated with 
feminism and social critique of gender, race and class. It is directed to the expression of the 
diversity of experience and complexity of the subject. 
The understanding of how film phenomenology meets the requirements of the cultural 
context and corresponds with the new patterns of production of knowledge is necessary if we 
strive for responsible research and want to apply this methodology consciously. In my thesis, I 
do not offer a comprehensive discursive and cultural analysis of phenomenological turn. I have 
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tried to delineate the general specificity of phenomenological agenda in terms of its status within 
the institution of film studies and contemporary culture. 
Meanwhile, another task of my study was to show how film phenomenology relates to 
the concrete intellectual tradition of philosophical thinking. Examination of the basic concepts 
and methods of phenomenological philosophy which inform film phenomenology helps clarify 
the possibilities and intentions of the latter. I analyzed the most important assumptions of 
phenomenology about the nature of experience, intentionality of consciousness and strategies of 
phenomenological epistemology based on descriptive method and reduction. 
In general, phenomenology aims to restore a living, immediate experience which is 
understood as a reflexive awareness of our own existence and presence in the world here and 
now. It considers experience as a manifestation of our unity with the world which was neglected 
by the Western rationalism. This unity is possible due to the fundamental intentionality of our 
consciousness. Intentionality means the directedness of consciousness to an object. It means that 
our consciousness is never empty, it is always of something. That is, phenomenology rejects the 
idea that we can separate the consciousness or experience from their content. For instance, 
thinking of a tree, hearing a sound of streets, watching a film are all events of diffusion between 
us and these objective phenomena. 
For phenomenology, articulation of experience must be implemented through specific 
mode of language, namely, through simple description. The descriptive method implies 
exclusion of all evaluations, judgements, and opinions about the object and using of regular 
everyday language. The task of this method is to recreate the experiential integrity of subject and 
object through elimination of explanatory and theoretical perspective. The pre-given theories are 
of interest to the phenomenologist only in terms of their belonging to the experience of the 
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world. That is, they become an object of phenomenology as phenomena of our experience and 
product of consciousness but not as heuristic tool or heuristic goal. In this regard, 
phenomenological epistemology always requires the high level of self-reflexivity and insists on 
the necessity to train our ability to talk about our talking, to understand how we are subject to the 
knowledge which is not a component of our immediate experience. 
 The bracketing of the pre-knowledge is what is called a phenomenological reduction. 
The attitude to reduction is a criterion for the major division of phenomenology into 
transcendental and existential movements. The Husserlian transcendental phenomenology aims 
to bracket any knowledge including the knowledge about the material existence of the subject. 
Its purpose is to study consciousness directed at itself. It is a study of consciousness which 
studies itself. The transcendental model has not received significant attention within 
contemporary phenomenological turn and its critical influence can be recognized in the work of 
only one scholar – Allan Casebier. Meanwhile, the tradition of existential phenomenology 
adopted through Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is what forms the basis of today’s film 
phenomenology. This tradition denies the possibility of the radical reductionism of 
transcendental phenomenology and fairly considers it as a principle which contradicts the very 
idea of phenomenology and returns us back to the rationalism of Descartes. 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology suggests that the limits of reduction lie in 
the sphere of our bodily, material existence. The knowledge about our body is a knowledge 
which never can be bracketed in our exploration of experience. The body is a point of departure 
for our orientation in the world. Moreover, the body is a lively representation of how subject and 
object can coexist through the unity of the mind and the matter.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s approach plays the major role for film phenomenology because his 
philosophy of embodiment directly relates to the new paradigm of thinking about the vision and 
our communication with the visible. Our body is the subject-object substance because it can see 
as a subject and can be visible as a thing simultaneously. Moreover, our bodily vision like touch 
reenacts the logic of diffusion of subject and object because we cannot distinguish the act of 
looking from its content. That is, it possesses intentionality.  
These essential assumptions of phenomenology, and in particular existential 
phenomenology, are constitutive for phenomenological theory of film experience. My final task 
was to examine how these assumptions have been adapted by film phenomenology. In my thesis, 
I point out that film phenomenology is not a single movement. However, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that the idea of dialectics of the seeing and the seen is what underlies all 
phenomenological studies of cinema. This idea implies that the viewer and film exist as 
components of each other. Film is not a static viewed object whereas the viewer is not an 
independent viewing subject. They absorb each other in the intentional act of viewing by 
mutually transforming the modes of their existence.  
This is exactly because both film and spectator are material bodies which can see and be 
visible. The viewer becomes visible thing due to the investment of his/her material being into the 
film and inability to dissociate this being from the film image. Our bodily senses and affects are 
imposed on the film and turn out to be seen for us. In addition, the visibility of spectator is 
conditioned by his/her real situatedness within the world. We do not watch a film from nowhere 
but always exist in the material spaces and corporeally interact with technologies. We, thus, 
manifest our presence to others.  
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Meanwhile, film becomes a seeing subject because it borrows the subjectivity of the 
viewer through the connection with his/her corporeality. It expresses its capacity to see 
subjectively through technology and active reorganization of the world. Finally, cinema 
functions as a subjective seeing due to its directedness to the profilmic world. In this regard, 
what film phenomenology points out is that film itself reproduces the experience. It directly 
represents intentionality of consciousness through the integrity of embodied cinematic perception 
and its object.  
Thus, film phenomenology offers us a research paradigm which eliminates the question 
about the object or subject of study. It focuses on their dynamic mutability and coexistence 
through materiality. The radical materialism of film phenomenology offers us another 
unexpected solution for conducting a study of film experience. Film phenomenology does not 
accept the idea that our experience is free from signification and cultural codes. For this reason, 
it denies that we can ignore the historical and sociocultural context of film viewing or aesthetic 
properties of film itself. However, it questions the view to sign as an abstract, immaterial 
construct. For film phenomenologists, sign can also be material, it is always connected to the 
flesh of the world. The viewer’s body is subject to the personal, gender, race, social, and cultural 
histories which are not ideal contexts but bodily paradigms of signification. At the same time, the 
cinematic body is the matter which bears the codes of technology, institutions, and aesthetics.  
Here, we see again that phenomenological paradigm fiercely rejects any division and 
hierarchy between the material and the immaterial. It erases the boundary between the literal and 
the metaphoric as well. The phenomenological model of semiotics does not imply that we feel 
and experience signs in the act of film viewing as culturally formulated, pregiven meanings. It 
implies that signs can be experienced corporeally. In this regard, the task of phenomenological 
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approach is to articulate how the carnal manifests itself in the signification and how the 
signification articulates its materiality in a living experience. This perspective overcomes the 
problems of the leading approaches to the film experience – psychoanalysis and cognitive theory. 
Whereas psychoanalysis suppresses the real bodily experience of the viewer and applies the 
ready-made concepts to it, cognitive approach suppresses the presence of concepts within our 
experience and considers the spectator as a mechanical body. Phenomenology, in turn, offers us 
the third way where the body and sign are inseparable. 
At first glance, it may seem that, despite its intention to recreate the film experience as it 
is, film phenomenology yet offers us some ready conception which explains how we interact 
with the film. However, I would like to emphasize here that film phenomenology based on 
existentialism argues that the recreation of the experience is impossible if we bracket the 
fundamental knowledge – knowledge of our bodily presence. As I have attempted to show, this 
approach does not explain the mechanisms and structures of the film experience but points to the 
basic condition of our experience which is the matter. The matter of both film and the viewer 
cannot be ignored by scholars and should be considered as an epistemological point of departure 
in our study of the film viewing. 
This thesis is an introductory research illuminating the basics of film phenomenology as a 
specific research program which reformulates the issues of subject, object, vision and sign. My 
hope was to reconstruct the cultural and philosophical foundations of this program which often 
seem to be obscure and ambiguous, and hence irrelevant. I believe that this epistemological 
project has a great potential for our understanding the contemporary media cultures and our 
interaction with them. For this reason, it deserves to be explored in order to be applied properly 
as an alternative to our habits of thinking.  
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At this point, I see three major possibilities for the future research of film 
phenomenology as an epistemological project. First, it is a study of ethics of film 
phenomenology. As mentioned above, phenomenological turn in film theory is one of the 
reactions of humanities to the bodily and identity politics formed by the late capitalism. On the 
one hand, these politics are directed to the formation of new type of flexible consumer/producer 
whose existence meets the requirements of the new economic systems. On the other hand, they 
allow a restoration of the multiplicity of the gender, race and social identities suppressed by the 
normative forms of knowledge. In this regard, film phenomenology finds itself in an ambivalent 
situation. While acknowledging that the viewer’s identity is unstable and dissolved within the 
world and that the articulation of the film experience must be self-reflexive and based on the 
recognition of the real conditions of the scholar’s existence (which include gender, race, etc.), 
film phenomenology reinforces both the capitalist agenda and humanistic, ethical intention to 
emancipate the identities from the epistemological and cultural dogmata. This dilemma has an 
ethical character and can become a topic for separate research. 
The second possibility lies in the exploration of the non-Western phenomenological 
thought. The suppression of the bodily nature of subjectivity and the dominance of the mind-
body division is a part of Western, elitist paradigm of thinking. The European phenomenological 
tradition which informs film phenomenology today still operates within the framework of this 
paradigm. Although it rejects the Cartesian rationalism, it always functions in relation to it. 
Meanwhile, many non-Western philosophies are sources which can help us overcome our 




Finally, it is important for the epistemological studies of film phenomenology to analyze 
the issue of language. We need to decide how to talk about our film experience, how to express 
its real nature. Film phenomenology insists on the necessity to use the descriptive, non-
conceptual, everyday language. However, it is difficult to outline the limits of description and 
distinguish it from the non-descriptive linguistic mode. Also, it is still unclear how this language 
can be adopted by academic institutions. Film phenomenology does not consider any alternative 
methods of articulation of the film experience. In this context, to provide some solutions to this 
problem would be a serious achievement.  
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